On November 5, Donald Trump was elected as the 47th U.S. president. Trump is an oligarch—an economic or political actor who secures and reproduces power and wealth, then transforms one into the other. And now he is in the small minority of oligarchs across history who have had second acts—having lost power or wealth, they find a way back. What can we learn from those experiences that might inform our understanding of Trump’s second term?
To answer that question, we looked at the track records of three other business oligarchs like Trump who have served as heads of state or government since World War II. Business oligarchs begin their journey by accumulating wealth, then move to power.
In our book The Oligarch’s Grip: Fusing Wealth and Power, we wrote about Chilean president Sebastian Piñera. He served two non-consecutive terms in office (2010-14 and 2018-22). His second act was decidedly worse than his first. During his first term in office, per capita income in constant dollars grew by 14%, while life expectancy expanded by 0.9 years. Sure, there were controversies, such as the appointment of Pinochet-era figures as cabinet ministers and protests over the end of the school voucher system. But, in general, Chileans felt better off.
While we are hesitant to make any grand predictions for the Trump second term based on these cases, it does seem questionable that it will be any better than the first.
By contrast, Piñera’s second term was disastrous. Per capita income rose by only 2% and life expectancy contracted by 0.8 years. The Covid-19 pandemic played a role in these outcomes, but it wasn’t the only driver. Piñera’s poor handling of a second, larger set of student protests has also led to his relatively low ranking among modern Chilean heads of state. He died in a helicopter accident in 2024.
Trump has been compared to Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s three-time prime minister (1994-95, 2001-06, and 2008-11). We will focus on his second and third terms, which are longer. Per capita income expanded by 3.5% in that second term, and life expectancy grew by a remarkable 1.4 years. Ambitious goals aimed at constitutional and tax reform were thwarted, but, still, Italians felt better off, even if they narrowly backed a center-left coalition that removed Berlusconi from office.
His third term was dominated by the 2007-08 global financial crisis, the Great Recession of 2008-09, and the 2009-10 eurozone crisis. Italy’s economy was one of the most highly indebted in Europe, and higher interest rates led to a 6.8% GDP decline during 2008-09. Per capita income declined by 3.6% during this term, while life expectancy increased by 0.6 years. Having been ranked by Forbes as the 12th most powerful person in the world in 2009, Berlusconi resigned in 2011 as a deeply unpopular and polarizing figure.
A similar pattern of a poor second act emerges with Rafic Hariri, Lebanon’s prime minister for two terms (1992-98 and 2000-04). Per capita income grew by a substantial 44% during his first term, while life expectancy expanded in the post-civil war period by 2.2 years. But when Hariri returned to office for a second term, results were much less compelling: income up by 16% and life expectancy by 0.6 years. Political tensions led to his assassination in 2005. His son Saad served two terms as well and also left office under a cloud. A third oligarch prime minister, Naguib Mikati, is in his third term and, given the recent Israeli invasion, is unlikely to have a successful ending.
Does history offer any relief from this picture of disappointing second acts? Not really. For example, Marcus Licinius Crassus—one of the Roman Republic’s richest and most powerful men, served as consul twice (70 and 55 BCE), both times with often rival and sometimes ally Pompey. The first consulship led to the Triumvirate Alliance of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus. The second consulship led to Crassus being named governor of the endlessly wealthy province of Syria, where he was defeated by the Parthians and died in 53 BCE.
These examples suggest some preliminary findings and cautions. First, oligarchs’ second acts generally end badly. Sometimes, external circumstances drive this result. Other times, it seems that oligarchs don’t show much evidence of learning from their first terms.
Second, many oligarchs never serve in decision-making roles as heads of state or government like Piñera, Berlusconi, or Hariri. Some have agenda-setting power through political contributions or media ownership. Others have ideological power, shaping the way we think and act. Based on our dataset at the Center for the Study of Oligarchs, we are unaware of any oligarchs who had and lost those types of power who were able to regain it. We also don’t know of any significant cases of oligarchs losing their wealth and then recovering it.
While we are hesitant to make any grand predictions for the Trump second term based on these cases, it does seem questionable that it will be any better than the first. During that first term, per capita in the U.S. rose by 2.9% and life expectancy fell by a jaw-dropping 1.7 years. That record helped earn Trump a ranking as the worst president in U.S history, according to the American Political Science Association survey.
It is difficult to imagine how Trump will be able to successfully fight the dismal history of oligarchs’ second acts.
