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U.S. President Donald Trump waves after being welcomed by the NATO Secretary General for the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) summit at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on July 11, 2018.
If Trump moves forward with reducing U.S. involvement in the alliance, European countries may be forced to explore alternative security frameworks.
During his first term as president, Donald Trump criticized NATO, demanding that European allies increase their defense spending. This friction created uncertainty about NATO's reliability, a key aspect of its role in global security. Concern exists into his second term as countries like Ukraine brace for changing foreign policy.
This was heightened after a White House meeting in which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was reportedly asked to leave, contacting French President Macron and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte afterward. Since their meeting, events have escalated, including the European Commission's proposal to borrow 150 billion euros for E.U. governments to invest in rearmament amid growing doubts about U.S. protection.
These concerns have also led some European leaders to explore alternative security arrangements beyond NATO. If Trump moves forward with reducing U.S. involvement in NATO, European countries may be forced to explore alternative security frameworks.
NATO's perceived instability could create opportunities for non-state actors and radical movements to challenge traditional security models.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there was no immediate answer as to what should become of NATO or future security structures. Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of a "Common European Home," proposed in the late 1980s, aimed to establish a unified and cooperative security framework that would encompass both Eastern and Western Europe. This vision sought to move beyond the division of military blocs like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, instead fostering a collective security system based on dialogue and cooperation. Institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were envisioned as key platforms for conflict resolution and diplomatic engagement.
A central element of Gorbachev's proposal was demilitarization and arms reduction, which he linked to broader Soviet arms control efforts, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990. Gorbachev also signaled an end to the Brezhnev Doctrine, Glasnost, and Perestroika, which sought to reform the Soviet system while reducing tensions with the West.
The United States put forward a contrasting vision. In his speech "A Whole Europe, A Free Europe," President George H.W. Bush emphasized the spread of free markets and the expansion of NATO's mission to support Eastern European democratization and strengthen transatlantic ties. He positioned NATO as the central stabilizing force in post-Cold War Europe.
While there are reasons why NATO's expansion filled the post-Cold War security vacuum, it remains highly controversial. Gorbachev's remarks and declassified documents provide a nuanced view of the debate, particularly regarding the infamous "not an inch" exchange between Secretary of State James Baker and Gorbachev. Baker's assurance that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction" has remained a point of ongoing contention, frequently cited in debates over NATO expansion and the commitments made during post-Cold War negotiations.
Baker's assurances were nonbinding and focused solely on NATO's presence in Germany, rather than a broader commitment against expansion. While these discussions did not explicitly address countries like Ukraine, any movement beyond Germany could be interpreted as conflicting with the spirit of those assurances. However, Gorbachev later emphasized that neither he nor Soviet authorities were "naïve people who were wrapped around the West's finger," asserting, "If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object."
Robert Zoellick, who participated in the negotiations as a U.S. State Department official, recalled that President George H.W. Bush explicitly asked Gorbachev whether he agreed that sovereign nations had the right to choose their alliances. Gorbachev affirmed this principle, effectively acknowledging that former Warsaw Pact countries could independently determine their security alignments. However, Gorbachev later expressed regret over NATO's expansion, stating, "I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990."
The debate over NATO's expansion did not end with Gorbachev. Russian President Boris Yeltsin also expressed mixed feelings, notably in a letter to President Bill Clinton. While he opposed NATO's rapid enlargement, citing what Russia believed were assurances made during German reunification negotiations, his position was inconsistent. During a visit to Poland, he reluctantly acknowledged Poland's right to join NATO, characterizing this statement as merely an "understanding."
Despite tensions, NATO and Russia initially pursued cooperation through the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which NATO pledged not to station permanent forces in new member states. However, Yeltsin later described this agreement as a "forced step," reflecting Russia's growing unease with NATO's expansion.
Other efforts to define NATO-Russia relations took shape through the 2002 NATO-Russia Council, which sought to establish equal dialogue. However, relations steadily deteriorated, first with Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia, then with the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and finally collapsing entirely in 2021 when Russia ended its NATO diplomatic mission.
George Robertson, former U.K. Labour defense secretary and NATO chief, claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin once expressed interest in Russia joining NATO, a notion Putin himself had also suggested. Putin transitioned away from these efforts, culminating in the 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, where he condemned the U.S. for seeking a "unipolar world," a vision he saw as destabilizing and unacceptable. He portrayed NATO's eastward expansion as a direct threat to Russian security and strongly criticized U.S. military interventions conducted without United Nations approval.
While there is far more history behind this issue, these fundamentals are key to understanding the barriers and complexities in discussing alternatives to NATO. The debate highlights core issues, including the West's interest in maintaining power, Russia's attempts to either integrate into or counter that structure, and the often-overlooked agency of smaller nations. These discussions tend to center on justifiable criticism of Western dominance, partly fueled by financial interests tied to weapons production, and Russian security concerns, while overlooking the actual security needs and self-determination of the nations most directly affected.
Although Russia perceived NATO enlargement as a threat, the newly independent states of Eastern and Central Europe had their own security priorities, shaped by decades of Soviet dominance. Many actively sought NATO membership, not to provoke Russia, but to secure their sovereignty in a post-Soviet landscape where Moscow's future actions remained uncertain. Dismissing or misrepresenting these concerns overlooks the agency of these nations. This was most recently evident in Sweden and Finland's decision to join NATO, which was driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine rather than Western pressure.
Discussions about the influence of institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the E.U. are important, but they must also acknowledge the genuine security concerns of these countries, which extend beyond external pressures or manipulation. For example, after gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine quickly recognized that securing its sovereignty depended on international alliances. In 1994, Ukraine joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). This decision was made independently of later political narratives and took place years before the Orange Revolution.
Ukraine also entered into the Budapest Memorandum (1994), an agreement in which it relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K., but this ultimately failed to prevent later invasion. It exemplifies how nonbinding agreements, lacking the enforcement mechanisms of military alliances, can create vulnerabilities and uncertainty in international security commitments. It also highlights the tensions Eastern European countries face when entering such agreements with Russia, particularly when they lack assured, legally binding military defense.
During and after this time, NATO's interventions led to allegations of war crimes, civilian casualties, and legal violations. These allegations span interventions from Kosovo to Afghanistan and Libya. The International Criminal Court attempted to investigate war crimes, including allegations of rape and torture by the U.S. military and CIA, but U.S. pressure shut down the inquiry. In 2019, the U.S. revoked the visa of ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and later imposed sanctions on her and other ICC officials involved in the investigation. Facing these challenges, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor, under new leadership in 2021, decided to "deprioritize" investigations into U.S. and NATO personnel, focusing instead on alleged crimes by the Taliban and ISIS. This further undermined NATO's portrayal of itself as a purely defensive alliance.
Over the years, various alternatives to NATO have been proposed, shaped by different geopolitical, ideological, and strategic considerations. These proposals generally fall into three broad categories: European-led defense initiatives, U.N.-based security strategies, and non-state or decentralized models.
Some European leaders advocate for reducing reliance on NATO, particularly on U.S. military commitments, by strengthening the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This vision promotes an E.U.-led military force capable of acting autonomously when European interests diverge from those of the U.S. French President Emmanuel Macron has been a strong proponent of this approach, arguing that Europe's dependence on the U.S. leaves it vulnerable to shifts in American foreign policy, such as those seen during Trump's presidency. His vision includes a joint European military force that could operate alongside NATO when necessary but remain independent when transatlantic priorities differ.
Another approach emphasizes strengthening the U.N.'s role in global security as an alternative to NATO. One example is the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, which aims to enhance U.N. peacekeeping operations by prioritizing multilateral cooperation over military alliances. However, the Security Council's structure remains a significant barrier to any U.N.-led initiatives, as the veto power held by the U.S., Russia, and China frequently obstructs meaningful reforms and hinders the organization's ability to respond effectively to global security challenges. While calls for Security Council restructuring have gained momentum, particularly in response to conflicts like the Gaza crisis, the likelihood of the U.N. fully replacing NATO remains low without substantial institutional changes.
Nonaligned or regional security frameworks have also been proposed. This includes a return to Cold War-era nonalignment, where countries avoid military blocs, and the formation of regional security pacts. Organizations like the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could potentially assume roles similar to NATO within their respective regions.
Beyond state-centered models, some anarchist and labor movements propose radical alternatives that challenge the idea that security must be provided by nation-states or military alliances. These models emphasize mutual aid, worker solidarity, and decentralized defense structures rather than state-controlled militaries. The Zapatistas in Mexico, for example, have established autonomous self-defense forces to protect Indigenous communities, while Kurdish-led autonomous administrations in Syria organize security through federated agreements rather than centralized military command. In Ukraine, networks such as Solidarity Collectives play an important role in providing mutual aid and logistical support in conflict zones, working alongside unions to coordinate efforts.
Although these decentralized approaches offer an alternative vision, they face significant challenges, particularly the lack of strong military deterrence. In regions dominated by state-backed militaries, their ability to resist aggression remains limited. However, as NATO's legitimacy continues to be questioned, these models could gain traction, expanding the debate on security beyond traditional military alliances.
Trump is unlikely to formally withdraw the U.S. from NATO, but his past confrontations with the alliance and his current treatment of Zelenskyy signal to European leaders that NATO's reliability is no longer guaranteed. This uncertainty has already sparked discussions on alternative security frameworks, ranging from a stronger European defense initiative to broader multilateral arrangements. If European nations increasingly view NATO as unstable or subject to U.S. political shifts, they may seek greater autonomy, altering the global security landscape.
At the same time, NATO's perceived instability could create opportunities for non-state actors and radical movements to challenge traditional security models. As states reassess their dependence on military alliances, decentralized defense structures whether rooted in anarchist mutual aid networks, worker-based militias, or regional federations may gain traction. While such alternatives face considerable obstacles, NATO's crisis of legitimacy could open space for non-state approaches to security, expanding the debate beyond state power and military blocs.
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During his first term as president, Donald Trump criticized NATO, demanding that European allies increase their defense spending. This friction created uncertainty about NATO's reliability, a key aspect of its role in global security. Concern exists into his second term as countries like Ukraine brace for changing foreign policy.
This was heightened after a White House meeting in which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was reportedly asked to leave, contacting French President Macron and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte afterward. Since their meeting, events have escalated, including the European Commission's proposal to borrow 150 billion euros for E.U. governments to invest in rearmament amid growing doubts about U.S. protection.
These concerns have also led some European leaders to explore alternative security arrangements beyond NATO. If Trump moves forward with reducing U.S. involvement in NATO, European countries may be forced to explore alternative security frameworks.
NATO's perceived instability could create opportunities for non-state actors and radical movements to challenge traditional security models.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there was no immediate answer as to what should become of NATO or future security structures. Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of a "Common European Home," proposed in the late 1980s, aimed to establish a unified and cooperative security framework that would encompass both Eastern and Western Europe. This vision sought to move beyond the division of military blocs like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, instead fostering a collective security system based on dialogue and cooperation. Institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were envisioned as key platforms for conflict resolution and diplomatic engagement.
A central element of Gorbachev's proposal was demilitarization and arms reduction, which he linked to broader Soviet arms control efforts, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990. Gorbachev also signaled an end to the Brezhnev Doctrine, Glasnost, and Perestroika, which sought to reform the Soviet system while reducing tensions with the West.
The United States put forward a contrasting vision. In his speech "A Whole Europe, A Free Europe," President George H.W. Bush emphasized the spread of free markets and the expansion of NATO's mission to support Eastern European democratization and strengthen transatlantic ties. He positioned NATO as the central stabilizing force in post-Cold War Europe.
While there are reasons why NATO's expansion filled the post-Cold War security vacuum, it remains highly controversial. Gorbachev's remarks and declassified documents provide a nuanced view of the debate, particularly regarding the infamous "not an inch" exchange between Secretary of State James Baker and Gorbachev. Baker's assurance that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction" has remained a point of ongoing contention, frequently cited in debates over NATO expansion and the commitments made during post-Cold War negotiations.
Baker's assurances were nonbinding and focused solely on NATO's presence in Germany, rather than a broader commitment against expansion. While these discussions did not explicitly address countries like Ukraine, any movement beyond Germany could be interpreted as conflicting with the spirit of those assurances. However, Gorbachev later emphasized that neither he nor Soviet authorities were "naïve people who were wrapped around the West's finger," asserting, "If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object."
Robert Zoellick, who participated in the negotiations as a U.S. State Department official, recalled that President George H.W. Bush explicitly asked Gorbachev whether he agreed that sovereign nations had the right to choose their alliances. Gorbachev affirmed this principle, effectively acknowledging that former Warsaw Pact countries could independently determine their security alignments. However, Gorbachev later expressed regret over NATO's expansion, stating, "I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990."
The debate over NATO's expansion did not end with Gorbachev. Russian President Boris Yeltsin also expressed mixed feelings, notably in a letter to President Bill Clinton. While he opposed NATO's rapid enlargement, citing what Russia believed were assurances made during German reunification negotiations, his position was inconsistent. During a visit to Poland, he reluctantly acknowledged Poland's right to join NATO, characterizing this statement as merely an "understanding."
Despite tensions, NATO and Russia initially pursued cooperation through the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which NATO pledged not to station permanent forces in new member states. However, Yeltsin later described this agreement as a "forced step," reflecting Russia's growing unease with NATO's expansion.
Other efforts to define NATO-Russia relations took shape through the 2002 NATO-Russia Council, which sought to establish equal dialogue. However, relations steadily deteriorated, first with Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia, then with the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and finally collapsing entirely in 2021 when Russia ended its NATO diplomatic mission.
George Robertson, former U.K. Labour defense secretary and NATO chief, claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin once expressed interest in Russia joining NATO, a notion Putin himself had also suggested. Putin transitioned away from these efforts, culminating in the 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, where he condemned the U.S. for seeking a "unipolar world," a vision he saw as destabilizing and unacceptable. He portrayed NATO's eastward expansion as a direct threat to Russian security and strongly criticized U.S. military interventions conducted without United Nations approval.
While there is far more history behind this issue, these fundamentals are key to understanding the barriers and complexities in discussing alternatives to NATO. The debate highlights core issues, including the West's interest in maintaining power, Russia's attempts to either integrate into or counter that structure, and the often-overlooked agency of smaller nations. These discussions tend to center on justifiable criticism of Western dominance, partly fueled by financial interests tied to weapons production, and Russian security concerns, while overlooking the actual security needs and self-determination of the nations most directly affected.
Although Russia perceived NATO enlargement as a threat, the newly independent states of Eastern and Central Europe had their own security priorities, shaped by decades of Soviet dominance. Many actively sought NATO membership, not to provoke Russia, but to secure their sovereignty in a post-Soviet landscape where Moscow's future actions remained uncertain. Dismissing or misrepresenting these concerns overlooks the agency of these nations. This was most recently evident in Sweden and Finland's decision to join NATO, which was driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine rather than Western pressure.
Discussions about the influence of institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the E.U. are important, but they must also acknowledge the genuine security concerns of these countries, which extend beyond external pressures or manipulation. For example, after gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine quickly recognized that securing its sovereignty depended on international alliances. In 1994, Ukraine joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). This decision was made independently of later political narratives and took place years before the Orange Revolution.
Ukraine also entered into the Budapest Memorandum (1994), an agreement in which it relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K., but this ultimately failed to prevent later invasion. It exemplifies how nonbinding agreements, lacking the enforcement mechanisms of military alliances, can create vulnerabilities and uncertainty in international security commitments. It also highlights the tensions Eastern European countries face when entering such agreements with Russia, particularly when they lack assured, legally binding military defense.
During and after this time, NATO's interventions led to allegations of war crimes, civilian casualties, and legal violations. These allegations span interventions from Kosovo to Afghanistan and Libya. The International Criminal Court attempted to investigate war crimes, including allegations of rape and torture by the U.S. military and CIA, but U.S. pressure shut down the inquiry. In 2019, the U.S. revoked the visa of ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and later imposed sanctions on her and other ICC officials involved in the investigation. Facing these challenges, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor, under new leadership in 2021, decided to "deprioritize" investigations into U.S. and NATO personnel, focusing instead on alleged crimes by the Taliban and ISIS. This further undermined NATO's portrayal of itself as a purely defensive alliance.
Over the years, various alternatives to NATO have been proposed, shaped by different geopolitical, ideological, and strategic considerations. These proposals generally fall into three broad categories: European-led defense initiatives, U.N.-based security strategies, and non-state or decentralized models.
Some European leaders advocate for reducing reliance on NATO, particularly on U.S. military commitments, by strengthening the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This vision promotes an E.U.-led military force capable of acting autonomously when European interests diverge from those of the U.S. French President Emmanuel Macron has been a strong proponent of this approach, arguing that Europe's dependence on the U.S. leaves it vulnerable to shifts in American foreign policy, such as those seen during Trump's presidency. His vision includes a joint European military force that could operate alongside NATO when necessary but remain independent when transatlantic priorities differ.
Another approach emphasizes strengthening the U.N.'s role in global security as an alternative to NATO. One example is the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, which aims to enhance U.N. peacekeeping operations by prioritizing multilateral cooperation over military alliances. However, the Security Council's structure remains a significant barrier to any U.N.-led initiatives, as the veto power held by the U.S., Russia, and China frequently obstructs meaningful reforms and hinders the organization's ability to respond effectively to global security challenges. While calls for Security Council restructuring have gained momentum, particularly in response to conflicts like the Gaza crisis, the likelihood of the U.N. fully replacing NATO remains low without substantial institutional changes.
Nonaligned or regional security frameworks have also been proposed. This includes a return to Cold War-era nonalignment, where countries avoid military blocs, and the formation of regional security pacts. Organizations like the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could potentially assume roles similar to NATO within their respective regions.
Beyond state-centered models, some anarchist and labor movements propose radical alternatives that challenge the idea that security must be provided by nation-states or military alliances. These models emphasize mutual aid, worker solidarity, and decentralized defense structures rather than state-controlled militaries. The Zapatistas in Mexico, for example, have established autonomous self-defense forces to protect Indigenous communities, while Kurdish-led autonomous administrations in Syria organize security through federated agreements rather than centralized military command. In Ukraine, networks such as Solidarity Collectives play an important role in providing mutual aid and logistical support in conflict zones, working alongside unions to coordinate efforts.
Although these decentralized approaches offer an alternative vision, they face significant challenges, particularly the lack of strong military deterrence. In regions dominated by state-backed militaries, their ability to resist aggression remains limited. However, as NATO's legitimacy continues to be questioned, these models could gain traction, expanding the debate on security beyond traditional military alliances.
Trump is unlikely to formally withdraw the U.S. from NATO, but his past confrontations with the alliance and his current treatment of Zelenskyy signal to European leaders that NATO's reliability is no longer guaranteed. This uncertainty has already sparked discussions on alternative security frameworks, ranging from a stronger European defense initiative to broader multilateral arrangements. If European nations increasingly view NATO as unstable or subject to U.S. political shifts, they may seek greater autonomy, altering the global security landscape.
At the same time, NATO's perceived instability could create opportunities for non-state actors and radical movements to challenge traditional security models. As states reassess their dependence on military alliances, decentralized defense structures whether rooted in anarchist mutual aid networks, worker-based militias, or regional federations may gain traction. While such alternatives face considerable obstacles, NATO's crisis of legitimacy could open space for non-state approaches to security, expanding the debate beyond state power and military blocs.
During his first term as president, Donald Trump criticized NATO, demanding that European allies increase their defense spending. This friction created uncertainty about NATO's reliability, a key aspect of its role in global security. Concern exists into his second term as countries like Ukraine brace for changing foreign policy.
This was heightened after a White House meeting in which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was reportedly asked to leave, contacting French President Macron and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte afterward. Since their meeting, events have escalated, including the European Commission's proposal to borrow 150 billion euros for E.U. governments to invest in rearmament amid growing doubts about U.S. protection.
These concerns have also led some European leaders to explore alternative security arrangements beyond NATO. If Trump moves forward with reducing U.S. involvement in NATO, European countries may be forced to explore alternative security frameworks.
NATO's perceived instability could create opportunities for non-state actors and radical movements to challenge traditional security models.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there was no immediate answer as to what should become of NATO or future security structures. Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of a "Common European Home," proposed in the late 1980s, aimed to establish a unified and cooperative security framework that would encompass both Eastern and Western Europe. This vision sought to move beyond the division of military blocs like NATO and the Warsaw Pact, instead fostering a collective security system based on dialogue and cooperation. Institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which later evolved into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), were envisioned as key platforms for conflict resolution and diplomatic engagement.
A central element of Gorbachev's proposal was demilitarization and arms reduction, which he linked to broader Soviet arms control efforts, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990. Gorbachev also signaled an end to the Brezhnev Doctrine, Glasnost, and Perestroika, which sought to reform the Soviet system while reducing tensions with the West.
The United States put forward a contrasting vision. In his speech "A Whole Europe, A Free Europe," President George H.W. Bush emphasized the spread of free markets and the expansion of NATO's mission to support Eastern European democratization and strengthen transatlantic ties. He positioned NATO as the central stabilizing force in post-Cold War Europe.
While there are reasons why NATO's expansion filled the post-Cold War security vacuum, it remains highly controversial. Gorbachev's remarks and declassified documents provide a nuanced view of the debate, particularly regarding the infamous "not an inch" exchange between Secretary of State James Baker and Gorbachev. Baker's assurance that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction" has remained a point of ongoing contention, frequently cited in debates over NATO expansion and the commitments made during post-Cold War negotiations.
Baker's assurances were nonbinding and focused solely on NATO's presence in Germany, rather than a broader commitment against expansion. While these discussions did not explicitly address countries like Ukraine, any movement beyond Germany could be interpreted as conflicting with the spirit of those assurances. However, Gorbachev later emphasized that neither he nor Soviet authorities were "naïve people who were wrapped around the West's finger," asserting, "If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object."
Robert Zoellick, who participated in the negotiations as a U.S. State Department official, recalled that President George H.W. Bush explicitly asked Gorbachev whether he agreed that sovereign nations had the right to choose their alliances. Gorbachev affirmed this principle, effectively acknowledging that former Warsaw Pact countries could independently determine their security alignments. However, Gorbachev later expressed regret over NATO's expansion, stating, "I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990."
The debate over NATO's expansion did not end with Gorbachev. Russian President Boris Yeltsin also expressed mixed feelings, notably in a letter to President Bill Clinton. While he opposed NATO's rapid enlargement, citing what Russia believed were assurances made during German reunification negotiations, his position was inconsistent. During a visit to Poland, he reluctantly acknowledged Poland's right to join NATO, characterizing this statement as merely an "understanding."
Despite tensions, NATO and Russia initially pursued cooperation through the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which NATO pledged not to station permanent forces in new member states. However, Yeltsin later described this agreement as a "forced step," reflecting Russia's growing unease with NATO's expansion.
Other efforts to define NATO-Russia relations took shape through the 2002 NATO-Russia Council, which sought to establish equal dialogue. However, relations steadily deteriorated, first with Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia, then with the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and finally collapsing entirely in 2021 when Russia ended its NATO diplomatic mission.
George Robertson, former U.K. Labour defense secretary and NATO chief, claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin once expressed interest in Russia joining NATO, a notion Putin himself had also suggested. Putin transitioned away from these efforts, culminating in the 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, where he condemned the U.S. for seeking a "unipolar world," a vision he saw as destabilizing and unacceptable. He portrayed NATO's eastward expansion as a direct threat to Russian security and strongly criticized U.S. military interventions conducted without United Nations approval.
While there is far more history behind this issue, these fundamentals are key to understanding the barriers and complexities in discussing alternatives to NATO. The debate highlights core issues, including the West's interest in maintaining power, Russia's attempts to either integrate into or counter that structure, and the often-overlooked agency of smaller nations. These discussions tend to center on justifiable criticism of Western dominance, partly fueled by financial interests tied to weapons production, and Russian security concerns, while overlooking the actual security needs and self-determination of the nations most directly affected.
Although Russia perceived NATO enlargement as a threat, the newly independent states of Eastern and Central Europe had their own security priorities, shaped by decades of Soviet dominance. Many actively sought NATO membership, not to provoke Russia, but to secure their sovereignty in a post-Soviet landscape where Moscow's future actions remained uncertain. Dismissing or misrepresenting these concerns overlooks the agency of these nations. This was most recently evident in Sweden and Finland's decision to join NATO, which was driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine rather than Western pressure.
Discussions about the influence of institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the E.U. are important, but they must also acknowledge the genuine security concerns of these countries, which extend beyond external pressures or manipulation. For example, after gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine quickly recognized that securing its sovereignty depended on international alliances. In 1994, Ukraine joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). This decision was made independently of later political narratives and took place years before the Orange Revolution.
Ukraine also entered into the Budapest Memorandum (1994), an agreement in which it relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K., but this ultimately failed to prevent later invasion. It exemplifies how nonbinding agreements, lacking the enforcement mechanisms of military alliances, can create vulnerabilities and uncertainty in international security commitments. It also highlights the tensions Eastern European countries face when entering such agreements with Russia, particularly when they lack assured, legally binding military defense.
During and after this time, NATO's interventions led to allegations of war crimes, civilian casualties, and legal violations. These allegations span interventions from Kosovo to Afghanistan and Libya. The International Criminal Court attempted to investigate war crimes, including allegations of rape and torture by the U.S. military and CIA, but U.S. pressure shut down the inquiry. In 2019, the U.S. revoked the visa of ICC Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and later imposed sanctions on her and other ICC officials involved in the investigation. Facing these challenges, the ICC's Office of the Prosecutor, under new leadership in 2021, decided to "deprioritize" investigations into U.S. and NATO personnel, focusing instead on alleged crimes by the Taliban and ISIS. This further undermined NATO's portrayal of itself as a purely defensive alliance.
Over the years, various alternatives to NATO have been proposed, shaped by different geopolitical, ideological, and strategic considerations. These proposals generally fall into three broad categories: European-led defense initiatives, U.N.-based security strategies, and non-state or decentralized models.
Some European leaders advocate for reducing reliance on NATO, particularly on U.S. military commitments, by strengthening the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This vision promotes an E.U.-led military force capable of acting autonomously when European interests diverge from those of the U.S. French President Emmanuel Macron has been a strong proponent of this approach, arguing that Europe's dependence on the U.S. leaves it vulnerable to shifts in American foreign policy, such as those seen during Trump's presidency. His vision includes a joint European military force that could operate alongside NATO when necessary but remain independent when transatlantic priorities differ.
Another approach emphasizes strengthening the U.N.'s role in global security as an alternative to NATO. One example is the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, which aims to enhance U.N. peacekeeping operations by prioritizing multilateral cooperation over military alliances. However, the Security Council's structure remains a significant barrier to any U.N.-led initiatives, as the veto power held by the U.S., Russia, and China frequently obstructs meaningful reforms and hinders the organization's ability to respond effectively to global security challenges. While calls for Security Council restructuring have gained momentum, particularly in response to conflicts like the Gaza crisis, the likelihood of the U.N. fully replacing NATO remains low without substantial institutional changes.
Nonaligned or regional security frameworks have also been proposed. This includes a return to Cold War-era nonalignment, where countries avoid military blocs, and the formation of regional security pacts. Organizations like the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could potentially assume roles similar to NATO within their respective regions.
Beyond state-centered models, some anarchist and labor movements propose radical alternatives that challenge the idea that security must be provided by nation-states or military alliances. These models emphasize mutual aid, worker solidarity, and decentralized defense structures rather than state-controlled militaries. The Zapatistas in Mexico, for example, have established autonomous self-defense forces to protect Indigenous communities, while Kurdish-led autonomous administrations in Syria organize security through federated agreements rather than centralized military command. In Ukraine, networks such as Solidarity Collectives play an important role in providing mutual aid and logistical support in conflict zones, working alongside unions to coordinate efforts.
Although these decentralized approaches offer an alternative vision, they face significant challenges, particularly the lack of strong military deterrence. In regions dominated by state-backed militaries, their ability to resist aggression remains limited. However, as NATO's legitimacy continues to be questioned, these models could gain traction, expanding the debate on security beyond traditional military alliances.
Trump is unlikely to formally withdraw the U.S. from NATO, but his past confrontations with the alliance and his current treatment of Zelenskyy signal to European leaders that NATO's reliability is no longer guaranteed. This uncertainty has already sparked discussions on alternative security frameworks, ranging from a stronger European defense initiative to broader multilateral arrangements. If European nations increasingly view NATO as unstable or subject to U.S. political shifts, they may seek greater autonomy, altering the global security landscape.
At the same time, NATO's perceived instability could create opportunities for non-state actors and radical movements to challenge traditional security models. As states reassess their dependence on military alliances, decentralized defense structures whether rooted in anarchist mutual aid networks, worker-based militias, or regional federations may gain traction. While such alternatives face considerable obstacles, NATO's crisis of legitimacy could open space for non-state approaches to security, expanding the debate beyond state power and military blocs.