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emmanuel macron
If We Want Peace in Ukraine: What Now?
Sometimes it is okay to say what's obvious: a stable peace settlement must be one that meets enough of Russia’s, and Ukraine’s, essential conditions. If they cannot be made minimally compatible, there will be no settlement.
Mar 03, 2025
Full details are yet to emerge of the “peace plan” that the UK, EU and Ukrainian leaders worked out in London on Sunday, and are to present to the Trump administration. But from what they have said so far, while one part is necessary and even essential, another is obstructive and potentially disastrous.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said after the summit that the following four points were agreed: To keep providing military aid to Ukraine; that Ukraine must participate in all peace talks; that European states will aim to deter any future Russian invasion of Ukraine; and that they will form a "coalition of the willing" to defend Ukraine and guarantee peace there in future.
This, Starmer said, would mean a European “peacekeeping” force including British troops. However, he has previously said that it would be essential for the U.S. to provide a security “backstop” for such a force. In other words, after all the talk of Europe “stepping up” and the need for European security “independence” from the Washington, this would in fact make Europe even more dependent on Washington, because it would put European troops in an extremely dangerous situation from which (not for the first time) they would expect the U.S. to save them in case of trouble.
While negotiations continue, so should existing levels of Western military aid, for otherwise the Russian government may be emboldened to reject any reasonable compromise. The Russian government has however repeatedly rejected any peacekeeping force including troops from NATO countries, which for Moscow is simply the equivalent of NATO membership. Trying to insert this into a proposed peace settlement is therefore either pointless or a deliberate attempt to derail the negotiations.
There is also a risk that the Ukrainian leadership (which, as Friday’s clash with Trump demonstrated, is prey to some very serious illusions about its position) may be emboldened to reject a compromise peace, and thereby end up with a very much worse one.
The idea that a powerful Western military force is also necessary to “guarantee” a peace settlement against future Russian aggression is moreover based on the fundamental misconception that there can be in international affairs any such thing as an absolute and permanent “guarantee.”
My colleagues George Beebe, Mark Episkopos and I discuss the actual terms of a settlement in a new brief, “Peace Through Strength: Sources of US Leverage in Negotiations.”
Those terms that Russia could accept and that would provide reasonable hope of enduring peace are the following: Firstly, that Ukraine should continue to receive from the West and help to produce the defensive weapons with which they have so far fought the Russian army almost to a standstill and inflicted very heavy casualties: drones, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, landmines, 155 mm howitzers and the ammunition for them. Long-range missiles capable of striking deep into Russian territory should be excluded as part of the peace settlement, but with the proviso that the West would of course provide them if Russia resumed the war.
Secondly, there should be a United Nations peacekeeping force with soldiers drawn from genuinely neutral states from the “Global South.” Russia calls these countries “the Global Majority” and has made reaching out to them a central part of its international strategy. Several are also fellow members of the BRICS group. Indian, Brazilian and South African peacekeepers would not be able to defeat a new Russian invasion (or a Ukrainian resumption of the war) — but Moscow would be deeply unwilling to risk killing them.
Finally, and obviously, a stable peace settlement must be one that meets enough of Russia’s, and Ukraine’s, essential conditions. If they cannot be made minimally compatible, there will be no settlement. It is however utterly pointless for European leaders to go on imagining that a peace can somehow be imposed on the Russian government, and not negotiated with it. They should pay heed when Secretary of State Marco Rubio says that peace can only come to Ukraine if Putin is involved in the negotiations, and that Trump "is the only person on Earth who has any chance whatsoever of bringing him to a table to see what it is he would be willing to end the war on."
The behavior of the European governments is shaped by a belief in limitless Russian territorial ambition, hostility to the West, and reckless aggression that if genuinely held, would seem to make any pursuit of peace utterly pointless. The only sensible Western strategy would be to cripple or destroy Russia as a state — the only problem being, as Trump has stated, that this would probably lead to World War III and the end of civilization.
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Why Europe Is Unlikely to Replace Trump’s US as Ukraine’s Chief Backer
The money isn’t there, and centrist parties in France and Germany are struggling to fend off populist challenges of their own.
Dec 06, 2024
Two main lessons are to be drawn from the fall of Michel Barnier’s government in France.
The first is that talk of Europe massively rearming itself and substituting for the U.S. as the chief backer of Ukraine while maintaining existing levels of healthcare and social security is idiocy. The money is simply not there. The second is that the effort by “mainstream” establishments to exclude populist parties from office is doomed in the long run, and in the short run is a recipe for repeated political crisis and increasing paralysis of government.
Two countries are central to the European Union, the European economy, European defense, and any hope of European strategic autonomy: France and Germany. Within a month of each other, both have seen their governments collapse due to battles over how to reduce their growing budget deficits. In both cases, their fiscal woes have been drastically worsened by a combination of economic stagnation and pressure on welfare budgets with the new costs of rearmament and support for Ukraine.
Large parts of the European foreign and security establishments write and talk as if none of this were happening; as if in fact these establishments had been permanently appointed to their positions by Louis XIV and Frederick II, and given by those sovereigns an unlimited right to tax and conscript their subjects.
In both cases, fiscal crisis has fed into the decay of the mainstream political parties that alternated in power for generations—a phenomenon that is to be seen all over Europe (and in the U.S., insofar as President-elect Donald Trump represents a revolt against the Republican establishment). This decay is being fed by the growing backlash against dictation by the E.U. and NATO that is occurring across wide swathes of Europe.
In the French presidential elections of 2017 and 2022, President Emmanuel Macron defeated the Front National (now the Rassemblement National) of Marine Le Pen by essentially uniting the remnants of all the centrist parties in a grand coalition behind himself. The problem with such grand coalitions of the center however is that they leave opposition nowhere to go but the extremes of right and left.
In the case of France, economic stagnation and resistance to Macron’s free market and austerity measures led in June of this year to crushing defeat for his bloc in European parliamentary elections. Macron then called snap French parliamentary elections in the hope that fear of Le Pen and the radical left would terrify French voters back into support for him. The result however was that Le Pen won a plurality of the vote, and while electoral deals with the left gave Macron’s bloc a plurality of seats, they are heavily outnumbered by deputies on the right and left.
Macron then ditched his left-wing allies and stitched up an agreement whereby Le Pen would support a centrist-conservative government under Michel Barnier in return for concessions on immigration policy and other issues. Bizarrely however, this was combined with continued “lawfare” against the Rassemblement National, with the prosecution of Le Pen for allegedly diverting E.U. parliamentary funds to support her party’s deputies. This is something that looks rather like a technicality or peccadillo, given what we know of the past behavior of E.U. parliamentarians—but would mean that, if convicted, she would be barred from running for the presidency in 2027.
This of course gave Le Pen every incentive to bring down Barnier’s government in the hope that it will bring down Macron with it, and thereby lead to early presidential elections; and when Barnier’s austerity budget (pushed through by decree against parliamentary opposition) infuriated the left, Le Pen seized her chance. Given the string of defeats that Macron has now suffered (and remembering that the far greater Charles de Gaulle resigned in 1969 after a far lesser defeat), it would make sense for Macron to step down. This would most probably lead to a presidency of the Rassemblement National; but then again, this is also probable if presidential elections take place on schedule in 2027.
German politics are in certain respects tracking those of France, but some years behind. Not long ago one would have said a generation behind, but European political change is clearly speeding up. After the 2021 general elections, the decline in support for the Social Democratic party, and the rise of the right-wing populist Alternative fuer Deutchland (AfD) and the left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) forced the Social Democrats into an uneasy coalition with two deeply ideologically opposed partners, the Liberals (FDP) and the Greens.
As Germany’s economic position worsened, internal battles over the budget also worsened until the coalition eventually collapsed. Opinion polls indicate that the centrist conservative Christian Democrats will come first in elections due in February, but will be far short of an absolute majority. The result will be a grand coalition with the Social Democrats; but if that also falls short of an absolute majority, and the Liberals fail to pass the 5% threshold to enter the German parliament, then (assuming a continued determination to exclude AfD and BSW), the Greens will have to be included.
Not only will this replicate the internal weaknesses and divisions of the last coalition, but it will mean that if Germany’s economic woes continue and the coalition parties’ popularity slumps, AfD and BSW will be the only place for discontented voters to go. These parties, being newer, are not yet nearly as popular as their French equivalents. AfD still has to go much further in the process initiated by Le Pen in the Front National, of purging its more extreme elements; and of course there is the special German historical fear of the radical right. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to think that the future German trajectory will resemble that of France.
Meanwhile, large parts of the European foreign and security establishments write and talk as if none of this were happening; as if in fact these establishments had been permanently appointed to their positions by Louis XIV and Frederick II, and given by those sovereigns an unlimited right to tax and conscript their subjects.
Thus in an article this week for Foreign Affairs, Elie Tenenbaum of the French Institute of International Relations in Paris and a colleague declare that in response to Trump’s election and in order to block a peace deal disadvantageous to Ukraine and “impose conditions of its own,” Europe must “force its way to the negotiating table.” A European coalition force of “at least four to five multinational brigades” should be deployed to eastern Ukraine to guarantee against further Russian aggression. European combat air patrols could be deployed “while the war is still underway.” And “if Russia remains unyielding, Europe must bear the bulk of the financial assistance to support Ukraine in a protracted conflict.”
Where the money and the public support for such a program is to come from is nowhere indicated.
I don’t know an appropriate and printable French response to these daydreams, but the Kremlin may reply with an old Russian saying: “Oh sure—when crabs learn to whistle.”
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'Pathetic': France Says It Will Not Enforce ICC Arrest Warrant for Netanyahu
"So they will apply this to Putin as well?" asked one political analyst.
Nov 27, 2024
A day after French Prime Minister Michel Barnier told Parliament that the government would fulfill its obligations as a state party to the Rome Statute and uphold the International Criminal Court's arrest warrants for top Israeli officials, the country's Foreign Ministry announced it would not detain the two officials if they set foot in France.
The Foreign Ministry claimed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant have "immunities" because Israel is not a party to the Rome Statue and doesn't recognize the authority of the ICC.
"Such immunities apply to Prime Minister Netanyahu and other ministers concerned and will have to be taken into account if the ICC were to ask us to arrest and surrender," said the ministry.
The ICC issued the warrants on November 21, saying it had found "reasonable grounds to believe" that Netanyahu and Gallant have intentionally deprived civilians in Gaza of food, water, medicine, and other essentials since Israel began its bombardment of the enclave in October 2023 and its near-total blockade on humanitarian aid.
ICC prosecutor Karim Khan has accused Netanyahu and Gallant, as well as a Hamas leader, of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Article 27 of the Rome Statute states that all people subject to arrest warrants are equal before the ICC, including heads of state.
Article 98 has been invoked as a "loophole" by state parties in the past when governments have refused to arrest other leaders whose countries do not recognize the ICC; it states that the court can't request the arrest of a non-ICC official if the arrest would require an ICC member to violate its international law obligations on immunity.
But the ICC rejected Jordan's Article 98 claim when it refused to arrest former Sudanese head of state Omar al-Bashir in 2017 and Mongolia's when it refused to turn over Russian President Vladimir Putin earlier this year.
"No international court has ever found that a head of state or high ranking individual has immunity before it, and Article 27 was meant to codify that principle," said Leila Sadat, former ICC special advisor on crimes against humanity, told Middle East Eye.
Former HRW executive director Kenneth Roth suggested the ICC should reject France's claim that Netanyahu has immunity, asking if French President Emmanuel Macron would also allow Bashir or Burmese army general Min Aung Hlang to walk free.
"So they will apply this to Putin as well?" added political analyst Yousef Munayyer.
The Middle East Monitorreported that France's statement on Wednesday came after a phone call between Netanyahu and Macron following the ICC's announcement last week.
RMC Radio reported that Macron told the Israeli prime minister that France "would uphold international law and noted that judges could grant immunity to heads of state."
Amichai Stein of the Israeli public broadcasting network KANN reported that senior U.S. and Israeli officials pressured France to make the statement on Wednesday, saying Macron's government would not take a leading role in Tuesday's Israel-Lebanon cease-fire deal unless France asserted it would not arrest Netanyahu and Gallant.
Matt Duss of the Center for International Policy called France's announcement "pathetic" and urged "more legal sanctions against Netanyahu and other ministers as quickly as possible," noting that the ICC warrants "apparently worked as leverage" to secure the cease-fire.
European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said immediately after the ICC warrants were announced that "decisions are binding on all states party to the Rome Statute, which includes all E.U. Member States."
But as HRW noted, along with France's announcement on Wednesday, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has invited Netanyahu to Hungary and has said he wouldn't face arrest there, even though the country is a party to the Rome Statute.
"Ensuring the ICC has the ability to implement arrest warrants will require defending the court against external pressure and coercive measures. That means that right now E.U. support for arrests should include preparedness to adopt measures to protect the court from possible U.S. sanctions," wrote Alice Autin of HRW's Communications and International Justice Program.
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