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The Arab East must no longer be a playground for non-Arabs to compete for their own ends.
There’s no two ways about it, the Arab East is a mess. It is weak, divided, directionless, locked in multiple conflicts, and not in control of its own destiny. This isn’t new. It’s been this way for a century, with non-Arab powers preying off the region in pursuit of their own aspirations. This has been playing out in four major periods that define the Arab East’s plight during the last century. While the players dominating Arab history have changed over time, the constant is that Arabs have been the victims of manipulation by others.
One century ago, the Arab East was caught between the colonial designs and greed of the British and French. At stake was control of oil, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal. These colonial powers carved up the region creating states out of whole cloth with imposed forms of governance, planting the seeds of conflict that have born bitter fruit since that time. Palestinians were dispossessed and dispersed to make way for a Western client-state in Israel. The Kurds were cut off from one another under the control of four rival states. The French ushered in a sectarian state in Lebanon with their favored sects in control, while Syria and Iraq had imposed monarchies which ultimately gave way to ideological military coups that masked sectarianism.
During the Cold War, the Arab East became one of many platforms worldwide for competition between the US and the Soviet Union. While the Soviets were the patron of the region’s “revolution movements” and “anti-imperialist” military regimes, the US cultivated its client-state Israel, allies among the monarchies wanting stability, and sectarian groups seeking to preserve their positions of influence.
At the Cold War’s end, and especially after 9/11, the US seriously overplayed its hand with its invasion and occupation of Iraq, ideology-driven advocacy of democratization, and total embrace and empowerment of Israeli ambitions. The result was two-fold: the diminished role of the US, which lost treasure, troops, and prestige while on this fool’s errand to create a client-state in Iraq; and the emboldening of non-Arab regional powers who saw an opportunity to expand their influence over this region.
And so here we are today in the wake of wars in Gaza and Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. While the Russians and the US still have their hands in the pot, it’s clear that the region’s newly emergent overseers are now, to different degrees, the non-Arab states of Israel, Iran, and Turkey.
Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sounds megalomaniacal in describing his country’s dominant regional role, while ignoring the reality that Israel is only in its position because of massive supplies of US weapons, back-up military assets, and political support. He claims to be fighting and winning on seven fronts, saving the West from the scourge of Islamic extremism. He is operating without restraint, genocidally transforming much of Gaza into a no-man’s land, with permanent bases as signs of permanent conquest. Israeli forces are doing much the same in Syria and, despite an internationally accepted ceasefire with Lebanon, Israel has already made clear that it will violate the terms of the agreement by retaining a presence in the south of Lebanon.
Iran, undoubtedly weakened by its losses, especially in Lebanon and Syria, may be down, but it’s not out. It retains the support of significant groups in Lebanon and some in Syria, not to mention its deep penetration into Iraq and Yemen.
Iran may have lost its lynchpin, Syria, and with that a weakening of its axis of resistance, but Turkey and its support for the region’s Islamic movements has emerged as the new factor in that country’s and the Arab East’s political equation. The impact of this development on empowering or emboldening ideological Muslim affiliates in neighboring states is not yet clear. Nor do we know how religious or ethnic minority communities will be impacted by or react. But it’s not unreasonable for them to be wary of what some fear are Turkey’s Ottoman Empire-like ambitions.
At the same time, the fate of the two major victims of the British/French machinations, the Palestinians and the Kurds, remain both unresolved and impossible to ignore.
The Kurdish nation was forcibly separated into four portions and incorporated into Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Today’s major flashpoint is between the Kurdish region of Syria, backed by the US, facing resistance by Turkey who sees its independence as threatening their continued control of the Kurdish community in Turkey. It’s a flare-up waiting to happen.
Meanwhile, Israel’s projection of regional power remains challenged by their continuing genocide in Gaza and intensified oppression of Palestinians in Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. This situation not only fuels greater Palestinian resistance, but also contributes to Israel’s isolation among Arabs and much of the rest of the world.
Some continue to blame the Arabs of the East for this sorry state of affairs, finding fault with their sectarianism or absence of leadership. This, however, is akin to blaming the victims. The divisions that exist are the result of external manipulation. And in the past, when movements emerged to create broadly-based unity based on a non-sectarian identity, external forces moved to crush or exploit them.
It's high time for the Arabs to take control of their destiny. The Arab East must no longer be a playground for non-Arabs to compete for their own ends. One place to start would be for the Gulf Arab states, the apparent locus of Arab strength these days, to convene a summit and lay out a vision for the future coupled with demands:
- a hands off policy for non-Arab states, with the threat that future relations will depend on adherence to this goal;
- a vision of non-sectarian Arab unity within each of the Mashreq’s states;
- an end to Israeli occupation, expansionism, and aggression against multiple Arab states;
- full self-determination for the Palestinian people and an end of the regional countries’ denial of the rights of the Kurdish people; and
- the creation of working groups to study the steps necessary to make these goals possible.
Some may dismiss this as a pipe dream. It won’t happen overnight because much accrued damage must be undone. But if a new vision isn’t developed, backed up by steps to translate it into reality, the region will continue to hobble along crippled by division and external manipulation.
Twenty years after the start of the military operation that led to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq is still trying to reclaim its status as a major regional economic player.
Research from Brown University’s Watson Institute estimates the cost of the Iraq war at approximately $2.9 trillion. Although it is harder to estimate the cost to the Iraqi economy—the approximately 300,000 dead civilians and combatants and 3 million internally displaced refugees was a trauma that is difficult to recover from—it is easy to see how much it has been set back by the conflict.
It seems a long time ago now, but back in the 1980s, Iraq was seen as one of the most advanced Arab economies, with some of the best infrastructure and the highest per capita income in the region. With the country so sorely dependent on oil revenues, which still represent around 87% of the government’s budget, the 1980s oil crash hit the Iraqi economy hard; the Iran-Iraq war also cost billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives, and the international sanctions that followed Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait sounded the death knell for this period of relative prosperity.
Then, following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the economy contracted by up to 50% by some measures, due notably to the widely criticized destruction of the Iraqi state apparatus; as flawed and morally bankrupt as it may have been, the Baathist regime provided a measure of stability that no longer existed after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the chaos of internecine fighting that followed enabled the rise of the Islamic state.
Massive Resources for a Slow Reconstruction
The U.S. invested significantly in the country in the following years, but much of that was in security—with a need to replace the disbanded Baathist security forces—and the rest of the spending in infrastructure was highly inefficient due to corruption and a fractured social order. As a result of all this, per-capita GDP is roughly the same now as it was in 2003. A once-leading regional power had become a basket case.
Given the hardship that the Iraqi population has undergone over the last few decades, one can only be relieved that the authorities are making efforts to modernize the economy, but the road to economic recovery is long and littered with potholes.
Although it is true that Iraq seems finally to be on the mend, its economy remains extremely fragile and largely dependent on oil revenues. Indeed, a recent IMF mission concluded that a drop in oil prices could severely jeopardize the country’s macroeconomic stability and capacity to implement the reforms it needs. As such, it is concerning that OPEC is forcing Iraq to cut its oil production in 2023, which will amputate oil revenue.
The IMF estimates that growth was stagnant in 2022, although real GDP is expected to expand by 3.7% in 2023, but as Moody’s Investors Service said in its latest report on Iraq’s credit fundamentals, “Iraq is heavily exposed to significant carbon transition risks because of its economic, fiscal and external reliance on the hydrocarbon sector.”
The problem is that Iraq also still requires major investment. The new 3-year budget voted this spring allows for some of this; it was certainly crucial to allow the government to continue operating following several years of gridlock with the parliament unable to agree on a budget, and according to Prime Minister Mohammed Al Sudani the budget will enable the government “to start the implementation of the infrastructure projects and turn Iraq into one of the biggest workshops in the region.”
Al Sudani also believes that the budget “prioritizes the essential needs of Iraqi citizens and families, aiming to meet their expectations for government services, construction and infrastructure projects.” But critics disagree: “there is no real investment spending in the budget,” says Sajad Jiyad, an analyst and fellow at the Century Foundation, “it just focuses on expanding what was in previous budgets and leaves very little—a few billion—on investment.”
At any rate, as IMF mission chief Tokhir Mirzoev says, Iraq’s structural imbalances mean that even the government spending that is in the budget, such as it is, “could reignite inflation and foreign exchange market volatility.” Inflation is a chronic issue for Iraq, not helped by the fact that the country has a massive trade deficit: “Iraqi society buys everything from abroad, from agricultural materials to food and medicines, and industrial goods,” said Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in a recent interview with VOA’s Kurdish Service. “If you look at Iraq's trade or its trade balance with other countries, you will see that everything comes from abroad,” he added.
This is one of the subjects that Hussein discussed on his recent visit to Washington. Since the dinar collapsed after the 2003 invasion, many Iraqis chose to use the dollar for their everyday purchases, but the Iraqi Interior Ministry has banned trade in U.S. dollars to prevent runaway inflation. The recent sharp decline of the Iraqi dinar against the dollar is further causing foreign exchange volatility which, according to the IMF, has “adversely affected import-dependent non-oil sectors.” One of the ways that the Iraqi government is trying to fight this is a system for monitoring American dollars that enter the Iraqi economy and tracking when they leave the country, which has the added benefit of preventing the financing of terrorism.
The Central Bank of Iraq in Action
The Central Bank of Iraq’s (CBI) actions seem to be bearing fruit in this respect, with the foreign exchange market stabilizing, helped by the growth of real non-oil GDP, which is expected to reach 3.7% in 2023. Inflation, which peaked at 7% in January 2023, has begun to fall and is forecast to average 5.6% this year.
Meanwhile, in May 2023, the Governor of the CBI, Ali Mohsen al-Allaq, unveiled a new state-owned financial institution, the Social Development Bank (SDB), which aims to promote inclusive economic progress in Iraq. The SDB will "diversify the non-oil economy by fostering small and micro-scale projects, thereby stimulating the private sector and reducing unemployment and poverty rates," said al-Alaq. "The bank will be the first in Iraq to cater to low-income individuals, offering facilitated loans and simple guarantees to support vulnerable groups," he added. The CBI also plans to open a Centre for Finance and Business, which according to al-Alaq, “will host the securities market, the business sector, and financial institutions."
The CBI has also signed an agreement with British banknote manufacturer De La Rue for the production of polymer notes. This decision seems somewhat at odds with the other recent positive initiatives by the Iraqi government to modernize their economy. Indeed, polymer banknotes are far from having proved themselves as a prudent fiduciary choice, and certain countries which had previously rolled out polymer banknotes because they were thought to be more robust, have backtracked because the notes started to show signs of wear and tear much more rapidly than originally thought. With a shorter-than-expected lifespan, it becomes harder to amortize the extra initial cost of polymer banknotes and the anticipated savings are not forthcoming.
Many of the central banks around the world who have made the transition to polymer banknotes also cite their greater security, but again, polymer banknotes add little in this respect; modern printing techniques mean that paper banknotes, like the Euro notes, which are made of cotton fiber, boast numerous cutting-edge security features like raised ink, security threads, and holograms. In fact, because some of these security features are woven into the actual fabric of the paper, modern paper banknotes may even be harder to counterfeit than polymer banknotes, on which security features are simply added to the substrate. It is easier for counterfeiters to obtain polymer material and try to imitate the security features that are printed on the surface of banknotes than to accurately reproduce the embedded threads, for example, that are used in banknotes like the new Euro series. According to the European Central Bank, the number of counterfeit Euro banknotes withdrawn from circulation reached a record low in 2021, and indeed, one of the largest counterfeiting operations shut down in recent memory was for polymer banknotes in Romania. Likewise, it is worth noting that the U.S. dollar—the world's principal reserve currency and the most widely used currency in the world—is still printed on paper. The U.S. dollar is subject to a high degree of regulation and oversight, so if the Federal Reserve is not considering switching to polymer banknotes, the consensus must be that paper provides strong enough protection against counterfeiting.
Given the hardship that the Iraqi population has undergone over the last few decades, one can only be relieved that the authorities are making efforts to modernize the economy, but the road to economic recovery is long and littered with potholes; to maintain credibility in Iraq’s fiscal policy, the government should continue to focus on more productive measures, rather than falling prey to fads that do nothing to promote actual economic stability.
The disgraced former president's rhetorical victory lap that came before protracted bloodshed deserves all of its notoriety 20 years later.
Twenty years ago, President George W. Bush landed in a twin-engine Navy jet on an aircraft carrier, strode across the deck in a bulky flight suit and proceeded to give a televised victory speech under a huge red-white-and-blue banner announcing “Mission Accomplished.” For Bush, the optics on May 1, 2003 could hardly have been more triumphant. From the USS Abraham Lincoln, he delivered a stirring coda, proclaiming that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” just six weeks after the United States led the invasion of that country.
But Bush’s jubilant claim unraveled as combat escalated between Iraqi insurgents and occupying forces. During the next nine years, the official death toll among U.S. troops went from under 200 to more than 4,400, while the deaths of Iraqi people surged into the hundreds of thousands. The physical wounds were even more numerous, the emotional injuries incalculable.
The “Mission Accomplished” banner and Bush’s speech going with it have become notorious. But focusing only on his faulty claim that the war was over ignores other key untruths in the oratory.
“We have fought for the cause of liberty,” Bush declared. He did not mention the cause of oil.
By dodging inconvenient truths about the impacts of U.S. warfare on “the innocent,” Bush was reasserting the usual pretenses of presidents who elide the actual human toll of their wars while predicting successful outcomes.
A few months before the invasion, a soft-spoken Iraqi man who was my driver in Baghdad waited until we were alone at a picnic table in a park before saying that he wished Iraq had no oil—because then there would be no reason to fear an invasion. Years later, some U.S. authorities were candid about Iraq’s massive oil reserves as an incentive for the war.
“I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil,” former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan wrote in his 2007 memoir. That same year, a former head of the U.S. Central Command in Iraq, Gen. John Abizaid, had this to say: “Of course it’s about oil, we can’t really deny that.” And Sen. Chuck Hagel, who later became Defense Secretary, commented: “People say we’re not fighting for oil. Of course we are.”
While touting the war effort as entirely noble, Bush’s “mission accomplished” speech credited the Pentagon’s “new tactics and precision weapons” for avoiding “violence against civilians.” The president added that “it is a great moral advance when the guilty have far more to fear from war than the innocent.”
Such soothing words masked brutal realities. Civilian deaths accounted for 40 percent of “people killed directly in the violence of the U.S. post-9/11 wars,” according to the Costs of War project at Brown University. In fact, a large majority of the casualties of those wars have been civilians. “Several times as many more have been killed as a reverberating effect of the wars—because, for example, of water loss, sewage and other infrastructural issues, and war-related disease.”
By dodging inconvenient truths about the impacts of U.S. warfare on “the innocent,” Bush was reasserting the usual pretenses of presidents who elide the actual human toll of their wars while predicting successful outcomes.
On May 1, 2012, exactly nine years after Bush’s speech on the aircraft carrier, President Barack Obama spoke to the American people from Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. With U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan near a peak of 100,000, Obama expressed confidence that “we will complete our mission and end the war in Afghanistan.”
Both Bush and Obama would later be widely faulted for voicing undue optimism about fulfilling a war’s “mission.” But the critiques have rarely devoted much attention to scrutinizing the assumptions that propelled support for the missions.
The U.S. government’s inherent prerogative to intervene militarily in other countries has seldom been directly challenged in America’s mainstream media and official discourse. Instead, debates have routinely revolved around whether, where, when, and how intervention is prudent and likely to prevail.
But we might want to ask ourselves: What if Bush had been correct in May 2003—and U.S. forces really were at the end of major combat operations in Iraq? What if Obama had been correct in May 2012—and U.S. forces were able to “complete our mission” in Afghanistan? In each case, conventional wisdom would have gauged success in terms of military victory rather than such matters as adherence to international law or regard for human life.
Today, it's a wonder to behold the fully justified denunciations of Russia’s horrific invasion of Ukraine from some of the same U.S. government leaders who avidly supported the horrific invasion of Iraq. The concept that might makes right doesn’t sound good, but in practice it has repeatedly been the basis of U.S. policy. Wayne Morse, the senator from Oregon who opposed the Vietnam War from the outset, was cogent when he said: “I don’t know why we think, just because we’re mighty, that we have the right to try to substitute might for right.”
George W. Bush’s performance with the “Mission Accomplished” banner—a rhetorical victory lap that came before protracted bloodshed—deserves all of its notoriety 20 years later. His claims of success for the Iraq war mission are now easy grounds for derision. But the more difficult truths to plow through have to do with why the mission should never have been attempted in the first place.