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korean war
Return to Diplomacy to Reduce Nuclear Risk in Korea
The U.S. must redirect its focus away from “complete denuclearization” toward first creating an environment in which North Korea will not perceive nuclear weapons as an appropriate response or precaution.
Jul 28, 2023
After seven decades of a state of armistice between the United States and North Korea, tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea has continued to strengthen its nuclear deterrent, and the United States and South Korea have insisted on pressure-based tactics that have failed for decades to achieve progress toward denuclearization. Because of these failures, North Korea is building up a substantial deterrent that doctrinally prioritizes nuclear warfighting and South Korea’s political discourse is moving pro-nuclear.
The status quo is only escalating tensions and incurring steep fiscal costs, and it must change before things get worse. A step-by-step approach to de-escalation and risk reduction based on mutual trust and transparency will create a more stable environment and forge a path toward peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
Intensifying Tensions and Arms Race in East Asia
While the exact capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal are not well known, the nation has made a concerted effort to demonstrate that it possesses both the will and the capability to use nuclear weapons in response to—or in some cases to preempt—aggression from its perceived enemies.
North Korea has shown recent advancements in its nuclear weapons program by testing a new solid-fuel ICBM, the Hwasong-18, and displaying a new warhead, the Hwasan-31. While the exact capabilities and readiness level of this warhead are still unclear, images released by state media suggest this new warhead is meant to be mated with a variety of short-range delivery systems, including cruise missiles and “underwater nuclear-capable attack drones.”
North Korea has also been prioritizing the continued development of its launch platforms, satellite technology, and post-boost vehicle deployment. While there is still much unknown, it is clear that North Korea is improving its nuclear deterrent.
Because North Korea views joint military exercises as rehearsals for war, some researchers compellingly argue that the exercises do not actually deter North Korea.
The heightened number of North Korean missile tests comes against the backdrop of deepening militarization by the United States and South Korea. In March 2023, the United States and South Korean militaries held their largest joint field exercises in five years. In May and June, the two countries conducted live-fire drills near the demilitarized zone border, called “combined annihilation firepower drills,” the largest of their kind. Because North Korea views joint military exercises as rehearsals for war, some researchers compellingly argue that the exercises do not actually deter North Korea. Conversely, North Korea heavily criticizes these exercises and often responds with more missile testing and provocations, which repeats the escalatory cycle.
Additionally, concerns about North Korea’s provocations have led to growing conversations around South Korea’s need for a nuclear arsenal. Recent polling shows more than 70% of the South Korean public support developing nuclear weapons or the United States returning nuclear weapons to South Korea. As South Korean public opinion tends to follow the tone of U.S. policy in the region, we’re seeing a deterrence-first approach from South Korea in reaction to the worsening tensions with North Korea.
The 2023 Washington Declaration between the U.S. and South Korea is an example of this continued focus on deterrence-based actions. The United States agreed to regularly send bombers, aircraft carriers, and other assets to the region, in exchange for South Korea agreeing to not pursue its own nuclear weapons program.
Recently, the USS Kentucky SSBN arrived in Busan, South Korea, marking the first SSBN visit since 1981 and the first time the United States has placed nuclear weapons in South Korea since 1991. These moves eliminate the possibility that North Korea will return to the negotiation table and instead perpetuate the cycle of tit-for-tat military provocations that increase the possibility of escalation—evidenced by the satellite launches and ballistic missile tests North Korea has conducted since the signing of the declaration.
The Status Quo is Not Working
In order to de-escalate rising tensions, the United States should reconsider the status quo policies it has pursued for decades. The current goal of “complete denuclearization” is based on the phrase “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization,” or CVID, which dates back to the six-party talks that began in 2003. North Korea at the time threatened to cease engagement with the United States if it insisted on pursuing a CVID stance. Nevertheless, the Bush administration demanded “nothing less” than CVID, and efforts at diplomacy and arms control consistently failed to achieve progress.
This insistence (and misunderstanding) on the goal of CVID has continuously prevented the United States from making any progress on deterring or dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as it stands today is complex and established—“complete denuclearization” two decades ago meant something very different than it does today, and remains a non-starter for Kim Jong Un.
Today, the United States insists on the two-decades-old stance that was implemented in a context where North Korea had no nuclear weapons and had not even conducted its first nuclear test. Since 2003, North Korea has survived economic hardship and a major leadership transition—contrary to what many thought would happen—while simultaneously pursuing a capable nuclear weapons program that has become an integral aspect of the nation’s culture, economics, and politics. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as it stands today is complex and established—“complete denuclearization” two decades ago meant something very different than it does today, and remains a non-starter for Kim Jong Un.
After all, Kim Jong Un has made statements specifically about the “irreversibility” of North Korea’s nuclear program and commitment to “never give up its nukes.”
Risk Reduction Must Come First
In September 2022, North Korea codified a new nuclear doctrine that alluded to the potential for delegated launch authority and claimed that its nuclear weapons are prepared to be launched “automatically and immediately” if need be. Because of North Korea’s legitimate security concerns and its significantly inferior conventional capabilities, Kim may view the escalation to nuclear first use—whether preemptive or retaliatory—as a viable strategic option. Prioritizing risk reduction is in the immediate best interest of the United States and its allies.
The United States must redirect its focus away from “complete denuclearization” toward first creating an environment in which North Korea will not perceive nuclear weapons as an appropriate response or precaution. Without approving or accepting North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, the United States can recognize the deterrence dynamic that already exists, which will open the door for engaging in risk-reduction measures that stem from a shared interest in ensuring stability and preventing war. Persisting with the status quo leaves no room for diplomatic pathways that may foster stability and help de-escalate tensions in an imminent security crisis.
De-escalatory measures could also be key steps toward eventual denuclearization. Implementing regularly-used communications channels could help mitigate the potential for misunderstanding or mishap while also being an initial action for re-engagement in arms control discussions. Focusing on confidence-building measures and dialogue could help to build up some level of trust upon which more conversations about transparency can be based.
If the United States can focus on mutual transparency measures and consider North Korea’s security concerns, this would open up space for discussions around loosening North Korea’s grip on its nuclear weapons.
Eventually, regular conversations and exchanges of information could lead to freezing the production of fissile materials or implementing a missile launch moratorium will mitigate the risks of nuclear use while providing momentum for the dismantlement of certain systems or even a no-first-use agreement.
If the United States can focus on mutual transparency measures and consider North Korea’s security concerns, this would open up space for discussions around loosening North Korea’s grip on its nuclear weapons and pulling back the throttle on its weapons testing and deployments.
History has shown that diplomatic approaches decrease provocations on the Korean Peninsula, while pressure-based tactics narrow the space for a viable solution. Both sides have to address mutual security concerns and gain each other’s trust in order to have any hope of moving toward peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
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We Must Finally End the Korean War
While much attention is paid to North Korea’s nuclear program and aggressive rhetoric, Americans also need to understand how the U.S. government’s actions exacerbate tensions—and why we have a critical role to play in ending this war.
Jul 27, 2023
July 27 marked 70 years since the signing of the armistice that halted—but did not end—the Korean War. Since then, the divided Peninsula has been locked in a perpetual state of war that grows ever more dangerous.
In recent weeks, the U.S. has flown nuclear-capable bombers, launched nuclear war planning talks with South Korean officials, and sent a nuclear-capable submarine to South Korea for the first time in 42 years.
This followed the largest-ever live-fire military drills near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that divides Korea. North Korea has responded with missile tests—and recently threatened nuclear retaliation.
To avert nuclear war and protect our environment, Americans must demand an end to the growing U.S. military presence around the world and rein in our nearly $900 billion military budget.
As a Korean American with family ties to both sides of the DMZ, I know that as long as this war continues, everyday people—Americans as well as Koreans—pay the steepest price. The Korean War inaugurated the U.S. military industrial complex, quadrupled U.S. defense spending, and set the U.S. on a course to become the world’s military police.
While much attention is paid to North Korea’s nuclear program and aggressive rhetoric, Americans also need to understand how the U.S. government’s actions exacerbate tensions—and why we have a critical role to play in ending this war.
To start, we must remember the central role of the U.S. in the Korean War—and just how destructive the fighting was.
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has described the war as an example of what a “successful” U.S. war can “achieve.” Other talking heads have made similar claims, offering the war as a model for how to proceed in Ukraine. This revisionism is dangerous.
The Korean War killed over 4 million people, more than half of them civilians. From 1950 to 1953, the U.S. dropped 32,000 tons of napalm and 635,000 tons of bombs—more than were dropped in the Pacific theater in World War II. The U.S. military showed “next to no concern for civilian casualties,” historian Bruce Cummings notes, burning 80% of North Korea’s cities to the ground.
Even after this mass destruction, the Peninsula is still at war today—with ongoing consequences for Koreans on both sides of the DMZ.
The U.S. has evicted families from their homes in South Korea to build military bases, while chemicals leaking from bases have poisoned local environments and contaminated drinking water. The Biden administration continues to enforce a Trump-era travel ban keeping Korean Americans separated from their loved ones in North Korea, while sanctions hinder the delivery of essential aid to the country.
U.S. taxpayers bankroll this devastation, spending $13.4 billion to maintain 28,500 troops in South Korea between 2016 and 2019.
Unless we act, our communities and environment will suffer devastating consequences as our military presence expands across the Pacific.
For example, the Defense Department recently announced a missile-defense system to be built on Guam, comprising up to 20 sites across the island and billed as a response to “perceived threats from potential adversaries like China and North Korea.” This plan, like many in the past, will destroy precious landscapes.
In Hawai’i, leaking jet fuel from Navy storage tanks has contaminated drinking water for thousands of families. And next year, the U.S. will hold the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the largest annual maritime warfare exercise, in the state. Past exercises killed untold scores of marine life.
To avert nuclear war and protect our environment, Americans must demand an end to the growing U.S. military presence around the world and rein in our nearly $900 billion military budget. Our grassroots peace movement continues to grow, leading to the introduction of the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act (H.R. 1369), which now has nearly 40 co-sponsors.
To end the Korean War, we need individuals with all skill sets—storytellers, community builders, healers, and more—working in concert. We must educate our communities, fight for change, and together build peace in Korea and across the world.
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We Must Work for a Ukraine-Russia Cease-Fire ASAP
If history is our guide, negotiations for peace will take weeks, months, or perhaps years just to get Ukraine and its allies to agree on a negotiating strategy.
Jun 14, 2023
Negotiations, cease-fires, armistices, and peace agreements are as old as wars themselves.
Every war ends with some version of one of them.
Wars have been studied endlessly, but lessons learned on how to end those wars have generally been ignored by those conducting the world’s latest conflicts.
To stop the killing in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, people of conscience must do everything we can to make negotiations for a cease-fire become a reality.
To stop the killing in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, people of conscience must do everything we can to make negotiations for a cease-fire become a reality—and that was the purpose of the International Summit for Peace in Ukraine held in Vienna, Austria, June 10-11, 2023. Over 300 persons from 32 countries attended the conference and participated in the robust program to discuss how to create conditions for a cease-fire and ultimately an agreement to stop the killing. (The websites for the International Peace Bureau and the Peace in Ukraine summit were hacked the day after the conference but should be up and running soon.)
History Reveals That Negotiations for a Cease-Fire, Armistice, and Peace Take a Long Time
If history is our guide, negotiations for peace will take weeks, months, or perhaps years, to get Ukraine and its allies to agree on a negotiating strategy—and even longer to come to an agreement with Russia after negotiations begin.
Even if all parties—Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. and NATO—would agree to negotiations tomorrow, and if the talks would ultimately succeed, it could possibly be months or years before the killing would end. That’s why negotiations must begin NOW!
History gives us an important insight into negotiations during a war and what we might expect to end today’s extremely dangerous international violence.
Negotiations for Peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam
In the case of the Korean armistice finally signed 70 years ago on July 27, 1953, 575 meetings between North Korea, China, the U.S., and South Korea were required over two years from 1951 to 1953 to finalize the nearly 40 pages of the agreement. During those two years, millions of Koreans, 500,000 Chinese, 35,000 U.S., and tens of thousands of U.N. Command soldiers were killed.
Fifteen years later, U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives met in Paris on May 10, 1968 to begin peace negotiations, the first time negotiators from both nations met face-to-face. Formal negotiations opened three days later, but immediately came to a standstill.
Five years after the 1968 meeting, on January 27, 1973, the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” otherwise known the Paris Peace Accords, was signed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong), and the United States.
The Paris Peace Accords officially ended U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, although the majority of U.S. troops would not leave until August 1973 and the fighting between North and South Vietnam continued until April 30, 1975.
The Paris Peace Accords officially ended U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, although the majority of U.S. troops would not leave until August 1973 and the fighting between North and South Vietnam continued until April 30, 1975, when North Vietnamese Army (NVA) tanks rolled through the gate of the Presidential Palace in Saigon, South Vietnam, effectively ending the war. Millions of Vietnamese and tens of thousands of U.S. military were killed during the years of negotiations.
We know much about the lead-up to negotiations to end the U.S. war on Vietnam.
In a nationally televised speech on March 31,1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he was “taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict” by halting the bombing of North Vietnam (except in the areas near the DMZ) and that the United States was prepared to send representatives to any forum to seek a negotiated end to the war.
Johnson followed this declaration with the surprising news that he did not intend to seek reelection that year.
Three days later Hanoi announced that it was prepared to talk to the Americans. Discussions began in Paris on May 13 but led nowhere. Hanoi insisted that, before serious negotiations could begin, the United States would have to halt its bombing of the rest of Vietnam.
However, fierce fighting continued. The North Vietnamese high command followed the Tet attacks with two more waves in May and August 1968. At the same time, U.S. General William Westmoreland ordered his commanders to “keep maximum pressure” on the communist forces in the South, which he believed had been seriously weakened by their losses at Tet. The result was the fiercest fighting of the war.
In the eight weeks following Johnson’s speech, 3,700 Americans were killed in Vietnam and 18,000 wounded. Westmoreland’s headquarters, which was notorious for inflated body counts, reported 43,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong killed. The South Vietnamese military’s (ARVN) losses were not recorded, but they were usually twice that of the U.S. forces.
After winning the 1968 election, President Richard Nixon, with his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, decided to follow the Tet offensive with a “maximum pressure” campaign with increased U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia which ended up with large death counts of North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, and Cambodians, as well as U.S. milita+ry.
“Maximum pressure” is already a part of the U.S. and NATO approach to Russia with its extensive sanctions regime and its provision of a massive number of weapons to Ukraine.
48 Cease-Fires Between 1946 and 1997
We can look to many more examples of how negotiations ultimately have brought killing to an end in other conflicts.
Using data from 48 conflicts between 1946 and 1997, political scientist Virginia Page Fortna has shown that strong agreements that arrange for demilitarized zones, third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, or joint commissions for dispute resolution and contain specific (versus vague) language produced more lasting cease-fires that provided conditions for dialogue for an armistice or agreement.
Figuring out how to make the cease-fire be effective will be the key task. Despite its less than stellar track record, the U.S. as a co-belligerent should work with the Ukrainian government to figure out effective cease-fire measures.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has already described any new negotiations as “Minsk 3,” a reference to the two cease-fire deals that were brokered with Russia in the Belarusian capital in 2014 and 2015, after its annexation of Crimea and fighting in the Donbas region. The Minsk 1 and 2 agreements included no effective mechanisms for ensuring the parties’ compliance and failed to end the violence. Minsk 1 and 2 were later acknowledged by NATO and the European Union as a ploy for “buying time” for the West’s buildup of Ukrainian forces and equipment.
Studies of Wars and Lessons Learned Have Been IGNORED by Those Conducting Wars
Having been in the U.S. Army and Army Reserves for 29 years and working as a U.S. diplomat for 16 years, I can testify to the results of endless studies of the consequences of war, for example the year-long U.S. Department of State Iraq Study Group, being ignored by U.S. politicians and policymakers, and lessons learned on how to end deadly conflicts being ignored by U.S. military and national security experts.
Guide to Do’s and Don’ts of Cease-Fire Agreements
I suspect that few Ukrainian, Russian, U.S., and NATO policymakers know of the United Nations’ 18 page guide to the Do’s and Don’ts of Cease-Fire Agreements, based on their experience in conflicts.
Therefore, for the record, I want to mention the main points of the “Do’s and Don’ts of Cease-Fire Agreements,” so no one can say, “We didn’t know.” Such work has been done already, and the pitfalls of cease-fire agreements well identified.
Each of the following elements has an entire section written about it in the 18-page guide.
PART A: Who, When, and Where
1. No room for ‘creative’ ambiguity;
2. The need for precision in regard to the geography of the cease-fire;
3. The need for a precise specification of the dates and times on which the obligations imposed by the cease-fire fall due;
4. Designating or qualifying permitted activities;
5. Application of the provisions of the agreement to all members of all armed forces.
PART B: Monitoring and Enforcement
6. Provision for monitoring;
7. Verification;
8. Complaints mechanism;
9. Enforcement;
10. Providing for the political resolution of disputes by the parties.
PART C: Organization and Conduct of Armed Forces
11. Military mission and mandate;
12. Codes of conduct;
13. Confidence-building measures;
14. Long-term treatment of combatants and casualties;
15. Command & Control;
16. Liaison and Information Exchange;
17. Integration;
18. Disarmament, demobilization, and downsizing.
PART D: Humanitarian Matters
19. Demining and civilian protection generally;
20. POW’s and other political prisoners;
21. Free movement of goods, people, and aid;
22. Dealing with the past.
PART E: Implementation
23. Funding;
24. Information to rank and file and to civilians;
25. Verification of size of forces;
26. Amendment of the agreement;
27. Anticipating lead times;
28. Avoiding media warfare;
29.Collateral agreements and legislation;
30. Civil security;
31. Buy-in by regional powers.
What Else Can Be Done? U.S. Should Appoint a Conflict Diplomacy Special Presidential Envoy
To show how militarized is the U.S. government’s thinking, while an entire new U.S. military command element—the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, led by a three-star general with a staff of 300—has been set up by the U.S. government, currently, there is not a single official in the U.S. government whose full-time job is conflict diplomacy to end the killing in the Russia-Ukraine war.
If the U.S. becomes serious about the loss of life in Ukraine, which it currently appears not to be, President Joe Biden should appoint a special presidential envoy who can begin informal discussions with Ukraine and among its allies in the G7 and NATO about the endgame of negotiations.
Additionally, the United States must establish a regular channel of communication regarding the war that includes Ukraine, U.S. allies, and Russia to allow participants to interact continually, instead of in one-off encounters.
This would be similar to the contact group model used during the Balkan wars, when an informal grouping of representatives from key states and international institutions met regularly and privately.
Will All Parties to a Cease-Fire, Armistice, Peace Agreement Be Pleased? NO Is the Answer!
We must acknowledge that even if negotiations did produce a cease-fire and then an agreement of some sort, neither Ukraine, Russia, or the U.S.and NATO would be fully satisfied.
In spite of recent history in Afghanistan and Iraq, many politicians, especially in the U.S., and now in Ukraine and Russia, want absolute victories, not long wars without a clear resolution.
But look to the Korean armistice, which was not viewed as the best U.S. foreign policy at the time it was signed. In the nearly 70 years after, the armistice has held and there has not been another war on the peninsula. However, converting the armistice to a peace treaty has been one step too far for the U.S. while the North Koreans continue to ask for a peace declaration from the U.S and South Korea before they will abandon their nuclear and missile programs.
A cease-fire followed by an armistice would give Ukraine the opportunity to end the destruction of more of its infrastructure, to begin recovering economically, and, most importantly, to end the death of more Ukrainians and facilitate the return of millions of Ukrainians to their homes.
In the case of the U.S. war on Vietnam, 60 years later, after the 1973 peace agreement, the country has now become a trading partner of the U.S. and the West.
How the negotiations for a cease-fire would work out is anyone’s guess.
But a cease-fire followed by an armistice would give Ukraine the opportunity to end the destruction of more of its infrastructure, to begin recovering economically, and, most importantly, to end the death of more Ukrainians and facilitate the return of millions of Ukrainians to their homes.
An armistice would give the Russian Federation an opportunity to possibly come out from some of the sanctions the West has imposed, to work within the international community on common issues, and end its military mobilization and the death of more Russians.
For the entire world, a Russian-Ukrainian armistice would reduce the risks of a direct military clash with the U.S. and NATO that could include the use of nuclear weapons, with terrible global consequences for all of us on this planet.
Campaign for a Global Ban on Weaponized Drones
At the International Summit for Peace in Ukraine, the “Campaign for a Global Ban on Weaponized Drones” was launched. This campaign reflects the opinion of many in the world that the use of this weapons system should be ended by all countries.
We know it is an uphill battle to call for an end to types of military weapons and, even if there are treaties enacted by the United Nations—such as on cluster munitions, land mines, and nuclear weapons—some countries, lead by the United States, will not abide by the treaties. But, as people of conscience, we must continue to act on what our conscience tells us is wrong.
People of Conscience Must Work for Peace and Non-Violent Resolution of International Issues
Likewise, for people of conscience in this world, we must continue to work for peace and non-violent resolution of international issues despite our politicians’ seemingly endless thirst for the continuation of violence in the name of peace.
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