Beyond that, we can examine what we know about Israel’s (still-underway) attack on Iran, what we know about U.S.-Israeli relations that shape how we understand the U.S. role, what we don’t know yet, and what may lie ahead.
What We Know About Israel’s Attack on Iran
On Thursday night, June 12, Israel attacked nuclear facilities and other targets across Iran. It attacked the nuclear facility at Natanz, but did not go after the deeply-buried and thus well-protected Fordow fuel enrichment plant until the next day. The United Nation’s nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirmed that conditions at Natanz were safe, with no evidence of radiation leakage. The impact of the attack on Fordow is not yet clear.
While a full report of casualties—military, civilian, scientific, children and more—is not yet available, we know there were explosions all over Tehran and in other cities across Iran. The Israeli strikes killed at least six nuclear scientists, unknown numbers of ordinary civilians including children, and important military leaders, including the chief of staff of Iran’s army and Ali Shakhani, who served as the main liaison between Iran’s top leader, Ali Khamenei, and the diplomatic team meeting with U.S. negotiators. Israeli officials bragged of having had agents of the Mossad, Israel’s international intelligence force, on the ground setting drone targets long before the attack began. While Iran’s initial response involved 100 drones that were all reportedly destroyed by Israel’s anti-aircraft systems, subsequent Iranian attacks have caused damage and injuries in Israeli cities.
We know that there is only one nuclear weapons state in the Middle East region. Israel maintains an arsenal that reportedly includes at least 90 nuclear weapons, and while it is widely known as one of the nine nuclear weapons states in the world, it is the only one that refuses to confirm or deny its arsenal. Iran has no nuclear weapons, and does not have a program to create such a weapon.
Israel remains the main destabilizing force in the Middle East.
We also know that while President Donald Trump abandoned the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA, in 2018, he has shown an eagerness to return to some version of a deal based on the same principles—the U.S. ending sanctions in exchange for Iran not getting a nuclear bomb. The long-standing obstacle to such an agreement was always Israel—which insisted that Iran be denied not just a nuclear weapon but any nuclear enrichment capacity, including civilian uses. Until just a few weeks ago, Trump had maintained the demand that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon in return for lifting sanctions, which Israel continued to reject as insufficient. In the last two weeks, Trump and others in the White House began to switch back and forth between the long-standing U.S. position and the Israeli demand, something they knew would be impossible for Iran to accept.
Before the June 12 attack, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was near the nadir of his popularity. He was close to facing the collapse of his government—and we know that citing Iran as an ostensibly “existential threat” to Israel, and claiming to be the only one capable of dealing with it, has always been at the core of his political career. On the morning of the Israeli assault, just hours before the missiles took off toward Iran, the Knesset rejected a no-confidence resolution brought by the opposition. That gives Netanyahu six months before another such resolution can be put forward. Whether it’s his political survival (he faces several trials and a likely jail term once he is out of office) or his long-standing commitment to challenging Iran at the top of his list, both were almost certainly part of the decision to launch this war.
We know that the U.S. government knew about the Israeli plans ahead of time—that was evident in Washington’s highly publicized decision to withdraw nonessential embassy staff, military families, and others from the region, citing the expectation of danger. The first acknowledgement of the Israeli assault came not from the White House but from the State Department, just a couple of hours into Israel’s bombing. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement focused on the claim that essentially “we didn’t do it,” and that Washington’s only interest was in keeping U.S. personnel safe. His statement urged Iran not to attack U.S. people or facilities because, you know, “we didn’t do it.” Significantly, it did not mention Israel, did not express the usual—however pro forma—expression of “we support Israel.” Trump, some hours later, wrote on Truth Social that he had told Netanyahu not to do it, and added that of course we support Israel. He did not, however, specify support for Israel’s actions against Iran.
And finally we know that this war stands to create new disasters across the region—most especially for Gaza. Because with the world’s attention pivoting to Israel’s war against Iran, the need to end the on-going genocide in Gaza is likely to slip far from the center of attention where it needs to be.
What We’ve Always Known About the Israel-Iran-U.S. Relationship
Washington has for decades provided Israel with enormous levels of military support, including the most powerful weapons short of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. For decades Congress and multiple administrations have guaranteed billions of dollars in military aid to Israel every year. In the last 20 months of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, that aid has skyrocketed. In 2024 alone, Israel provided Israel with almost $18 billion to purchase warplanes, tank ammunition, and thousands of bombs, including the massive bunker-buster bombs that Israel used in Gaza, but could also use against the hardened Fordow nuclear site just a few miles from Qom, Iran’s religious center. U.S. taxpayers paid 40% of Israel’s entire military spending that year—so regardless of whether or when U.S. officials knew of, or approved of Israel’s attack on Iran, there is no question that U.S. support still made it possible.
We also know that despite its recent massive attacks against countries and forces linked in some way to Iran—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, the Houthis in Yemen, and of course Hamas in Gaza (whose earlier ties to Iran were largely eroded)—leaving them significantly weakened militarily, Israel remains very isolated in the region. For example, Trump launched the Abraham Accords in his first term—agreements for Arab states to gain increased access to U.S. weapons sales in return for normalizing relations with Israel. Now Trump still favors the Gulf States, but he’s abandoned the condition that they be friendly with Israel—convenient for Arab governments given the public outrage toward Israel because of its genocide in Gaza. Trump’s willingness to leave Israel off the table as a condition for privileged access meant he did not even visit Israel on his recent trip to the Middle East—stopping in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.
What We Don’t Know
We don’t know for sure whether Rubio’s “we didn’t do it” and don’t mention Israel, or Trump’s “I told them not to” and “of course we support Israel…” statement most accurately reflects U.S. policy. We don’t know if Trump even saw Rubio’s statement, issued hours before the president’s own. Neither even hinted at any serious pressure to prevent an Israeli assault on Iran—and we know that U.S. military aid remains intact regardless of Israeli actions U.S. presidents may not like.
We know Netanyahu strengthens his domestic political position by attacking Iran, and that some Israeli officials believe a provocative attack leading to Iranian retaliation might bring the U.S. into the war. Those are likely both part of Netanyahu’s calculus—but we don’t know which is more important.
With the world’s attention pivoting to Israel’s war against Iran, the need to end the on-going genocide in Gaza is likely to slip far from the center of attention where it needs to be.
There are thousands of U.S. troops stationed in the region—a small number in Israel but thousands in surrounding countries. Right now the U.S. is sending two additional destroyers to the coast of Israel. While a military response from Iran is already underway, we don’t know if they will make good on their threat to attack U.S. targets as well as Israeli—and if they do, will the U.S. move from behind-the-scenes to direct military involvement, perhaps including airstrikes or troops on the ground?
What we do know is that Israel remains the main destabilizing force in the Middle East. Just in the last 20 months it has attacked and occupied new swathes of territory in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and is carrying out a genocide in Gaza. It has bombed Iraq and Yemen. And now it is raising the level of instability to a qualitatively new level, directly confronting the other most powerful military and political force in the region.
As is true with Gaza, we in the United States bear a particular responsibility to try to stop it—because, whatever the president or the secretary of state or any other official says or refuses to say, Washington is supplying the weapons and preventing accountability for Israel’s wars. We have a lot of work to do.
