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populism
Fealty to Neoliberalism and Corporate-Friendly Trade Policy Is Why the Democrats Lost
The Harris campaign could have told a powerful story about turning the tables and standing up for workers against corporate greed. She decided not to do that.
Jan 03, 2025
"The left has never fully grappled with the wreckage of 50 years of neoliberalism,” Democratic Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy wrote days after the election. “We cannot be afraid of fights, especially with the economic elites who have profited off neoliberalism.”
Indeed, the results of the 2024 election left many Democrats reeling. Once again, the very real frustrations many American voters have with their place in an increasingly complex and unequal global economy were exploited by a billionaire con man with a horrendous, hate-fueled agenda full of sweeping corporate giveaways.
Voters Wanted Economic Change
With the smoke cleared, we can see that there were a number of factors working against the Harris campaign and numerous pathways to victory that fell short. But it is undeniable that economic policy and messaging played a major role. Countless exit polls showed that dissatisfaction with the economy was the number one deciding issue for voters.
Take the three Rust Belt swing states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, for instance, where an average of 31% of voters said the economy was the most important factor in determining their decisions. Of these, 76% voted for U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Sixty-six percent felt the economy was in bad shape, and of this group, 70% voted for Donald Trump.
It would be preposterous for Democrats—in the name of fighting Trumpism—to revert back to the corporate-dominated rules of free trade agreements that contributed to the economic damage felt by working people and drove them toward right-wing populism.
And then there’s Trumbull County, Ohio, home of the Lordstown GM plant where Trump had promised thousands of autoworkers he would save their jobs. And though all of those jobs went to Mexico during his presidency and he did nothing to stop it, Trump overperformed his 2020 numbers there by nearly four percentage points, while Vice President Kamala Harris underperformed President Joe Biden’s. Trump also overperformed his 2020 numbers to beat Harris in Racine County, Wisconsin, where he had promised 13,000 manufacturing jobs back in 2017 that never arrived. Worse, Harris underperformed Hillary Clinton’s 2016 total vote percentages in every Rust Belt state except Indiana.
The Rust Belt got its name because of bad trade deals. It’s where a lot of good manufacturing jobs used to be before the era of neoliberal corporate-trade policies arrived in the late 80s. Back then, Republican and Democratic leaders alike pushed the myth of free trade onto a working class that had just endured a wave of skyrocketing income inequality and attacks on unions by Ronald Reagan.
U.S. trade policy plays a central role in these voters’ dissatisfaction. Deep feelings of betrayal left behind by the era of free trade fueled all three of Donald Trump’s campaigns and allowed his litany of lies and false promises about protecting manufacturing jobs to win over many working-class voters.
Recognition of “Free Trade” Harms
President Biden, previously a supporter of traditional free trade deals, learned some important political lessons from 2016, and the 2020 Democratic primary pushed him to incorporate parts of the economic populist platform endorsed by the Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren campaigns. Many of the same swing-state voters who went to Trump in 2016 responded to that message and delivered the White House to Biden in 2020.
During Biden’s presidency, thanks to key personnel like U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, the U.S. began moving away from the corporate-dominated deals of the past and made significant progress toward enacting a new “worker-centered” trade policy. And Biden matched this new approach with historic investments in new U.S. manufacturing to counteract job loss caused by past trade deals.
Instead of concluding free trade agreements, the administration promised that U.S. trade policy would serve, rather than undermine, these massive spending programs. There was more investment in new manufacturing facilities in the U.S. under Biden-Harris than at any point in more than three decades.
Trade Progress Uncelebrated
The Harris campaign could have told a powerful story about turning the tables and standing up for workers against corporate greed. They could have built a campaign, like Biden did in 2020, that took seriously the demands of the progressive wing of the party and the voters they inspired. They could have leaned into and promised to expand these progressive economic and trade policies. But the consultants and party strategists who helped guide them chose not to.
Instead, the campaign failed to credibly speak to the economic pain communities have been suffering and missed many opportunities to emphasize the very real progress the Biden administration made on that front. In speech after speech, Harris fell into Trump’s trap, arguing against tariffs that are supported by 56% of all voters, not just those in factory towns.
The campaign repeatedly attacked these popular tariffs, even disingenuously calling them a “sales tax,” despite the fact that the Biden-Harris administration had also strategically used tariffs to protect U.S. industries and manufacturing jobs.
With the Harris campaign not consistently communicating a populist economic agenda, Trump was once again able to sell his hateful brand of right-wing populism, falsely claiming that he alone was looking out for American manufacturing workers.
The Way Forward
It would be preposterous for Democrats—in the name of fighting Trumpism—to revert back to the corporate-dominated rules of free trade agreements that contributed to the economic damage felt by working people and drove them toward right-wing populism.
Instead, they should clearly and passionately outline a progressive, populist vision for trade that they will boldly implement when they retake power. They should demand large-scale changes that transform how our country works for working people.
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Will Canada's NDP Learn Anything From the Rise of Left-Populism in the US?
Now that we’re witnessing a revival of leftish populism from Harris and particularly Walz, we can plainly see what has long been obvious but unsaid: that a New Deal-inspired agenda offers more for working people.
Sep 22, 2024
It would be a great pity if the NDP squanders this promising moment to revive left-wing populism in Canada.
The current upheaval in U.S. politics, with the dramatic and unexpected rise of the Kamala Harris/Tim Walz Democratic ticket, may suddenly be opening possibilities here in Canada that have long appeared out of reach.
After decades of the business elite successfully imposing its agenda — tax cuts, smaller government, an empowered private sector — Harris and Walz are energizing a large swath of U.S. voters with a very different left-populist pitch for strong government programs, pro-labour policies, and tax hikes on the rich.
Such a pro-worker agenda, which grew out of FDR’s New Deal and prevailed in the early postwar decades, has largely disappeared in recent years as business priorities — supported by the media, academia, and conservative think tanks — have come to dominate politics to an extraordinary extent.
As a result, even left-leaning political parties have been afraid to get too far offside the business agenda, for fear of looking like they don’t understand economic realities and would be irresponsible in managing the economy.
Accordingly, Democrats in the U.S. and the NDP in Canada have reluctantly gone along with much of the business agenda — even though it’s produced a society top-heavy with billionaires, with little for working people.
But now that we’re witnessing a revival of leftish populism from Harris and particularly Walz, we can plainly see what has long been obvious but unsaid: that a New Deal-inspired agenda offers more for working people.
That explains the joyous looks on the faces of Harris and Walz as they push for policies — like a $6,000 tax credit for newborns — that would greatly improve the lives of millions of Americans.
President Joe Biden also championed pro-worker policies but had no ability to sell them. Harris and Walz are brat as salespeople.
All this stirring south of the border creates possibilities for Canada.
NDP Leader Jagmeet Singh signalled his intention to distinguish his party from the Liberals by breaking the Liberal-NDP supply-and-confidence deal earlier this month.
But he missed a big opportunity to do more — to move the party towards the kind of left-populist agenda pioneered by early Canadian progressives like the late Tommy Douglas, celebrated as the father of medicare in Canada.
Instead, Singh used the Liberal-NDP breakup to signal that he’s backing away from the Trudeau government’s unpopular carbon tax.
That was a foolish move, which will only bolster the credibility of Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre’s aggressive (and misguided) campaign against the carbon tax.
Singh could have differentiated himself from the Liberals much more effectively by insisting he’d only continue to support them if they introduced a wealth tax — a truly game-changing, populist measure with the potential to raise $32 billion a year to rebuild social programs.
The NDP actually supports an annual net wealth tax, which has been part of its official platform since 2019. But you might not know that, since the party rarely mentions it (probably out of fear they might look like irresponsible economic managers).
However, the tax, which would impact only the very wealthy, is consistently popular with Canadians, with polls showing support above 80 per cent.
Business strongly opposes a wealth tax, so championing it would put the NDP in a fight against business, the Liberals and the Conservatives — as a truly populist, pro-worker party — instead of letting Poilievre, posing as a friend of the working class, steal much of that vote.
A wealth tax is also nicely in line with Kamala Harris’ support for a “billionaire minimum tax” that would impose a 25 per cent minimum tax on total income exceeding $100 million (including unrealized gains).
Instead of crushing one of Ottawa’s few measures to tackle climate change, the NDP would be far more inspiring if it pushed to extract wealth from some of the most overprivileged people on earth.
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Why the Dems Should Campaign on Economic Populism
Ceding that ground to Republicans, in this moment of fluid coalitions, could cement Democrats’ role as being seen as the elite party—and potentially help usher in a second Trump term.
Aug 30, 2024
Every presidential campaign showcases the direction in which a candidate’s party is heading. This year’s choices of running mates are prime examples. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s selection of Ohio Sen. JD Vance as his running mate demonstrates the Republican Party’s desire to further its image as a populist, working-class party. And for her part, Vice President Kamala Harris sidestepped a centrist in Pennsylvania Gov. Josh Shapiro in favor of a progressive populist in Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz. The fact is that, policy wise, Walz’s populist bona fides are quite real whereas Vance’s are largely manufactured. But still, this much is clear: Both campaigns appear to recognize that the key to winning in November will be building trust with an electorate that increasingly sees both parties as elites, out of step with the concerns of ordinary working people.
To be sure, Americans’ distrust of elites is reaching a boiling point. Institutions of power—from Congress to the media to the corporate sector—maintain little of the public’s confidence. Among voters in both major parties, trust in government is at its lowest level since the 1950s. More Americans than ever view both Democrats and Republicans unfavorably, and a quarter do not feel represented by either party. Instead, most now believe that lobbyists and big donors, as well as big business, wield too much influence over politics. And an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public believes corporations are becoming too powerful in our economy.
Once we look beyond rhetoric and campaign promises, the party with the more credible claim to economic populism ought to still be the party of the New Deal.
This breakdown in the relationship between the mass public and elites is occurring alongside the march of class dealignment. That is, the Democratic Party’s base has steadily shifted from the working class toward upper-middle-class suburbanites—to the point that Republicans, for the first time in a half-century, can dispute Democrats’ claim as the party of working America. After all, the country’s richest areas are now blue, and the richest voters roughly split across the aisle. Sadly, at a moment when public disdain for the elite is reaching its peak, the Democrats are arguably becoming as much of an elite party as the GOP.
In many ways, the Democratic Party is uniquely positioned to benefit from anti-elite attitudes. After all, although populist sentiment has found putative champions on both sides of the aisle, not all these appeals are equally sincere. While Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders, an Independent who caucuses with the Democrats, has pushed to increase taxes on corporations and the rich, Donald Trump signed a historic giveaway for the wealthy and corporate America. While the Biden administration has strengthened organized labor, Republican judges and legislators have chipped away at the union movement. Once we look beyond rhetoric and campaign promises, the party with the more credible claim to economic populism ought to still be the party of the New Deal.
But Democrats can’t take for granted that voters will see the party that way. For that to happen, they have to embrace their role as defenders of the ordinary worker against the predations of a wealthy upper class. And so it bears asking: Are Democrats embracing this role? How many Democrats are employing populist rhetoric, by explicitly raising up workers, or by calling out economic elites? And is it working?
In our latest report, the Center for Working-Class Politics (CWCP) sought to answer these questions and more. In order to get a sense of where Democratic messaging stands, we conducted a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the campaign rhetoric of Democratic candidates for Congress in 2022.
While our complete study contains a wealth of important findings, our results with regards to economic populism are less than encouraging. We find that while anti-elite rhetoric is indeed effective at winning over working-class voters, very few Democratic candidates actually deploy it. By and large, Democratic rhetoric is not rising to meet our moment of mass distrust of elites.
To examine the communication strategies employed by Democrats, the CWCP collected the text from the websites of nearly 1,000 Democratic candidates running in the 2022 House or Senate elections. Our analysis provides significant insight into the promise of economic populism. We looked for two components of populism in candidates’ rhetoric. The first component raises up workers, casting them as the engine that keeps the economy running, and as deserving of a decent standard of living. This was commonplace: Over 70% of candidates spoke positively of workers. That said, less than half mentioned labor unions, so even here there is a great deal of room for improvement.
Harris and other Democrats should instead recognize populism for what it is—a powerful egalitarian sentiment promising to lift up the many over the few—and give voice to it.
The second component of populism, conversely, points the finger at economic elites as responsible for “mucking up” the engine—that is, for mass economic woes, for standing between workers and the quality of life they deserve. This type of rhetoric was much rarer: Less than 20% of candidates went after large corporations, billionaires, Wall Street, or price gouging in this manner. Less than 15% attacked corporate money in politics, and less than 5% of candidates went after the top 1%, corporate greed, or big banks. A separate analysis of television ads found that only about 15% of candidates called out economic elites in any way, even in competitive races, where such rhetoric was found to be most effective. This result may not be so surprising: It’s easy, after all, to speak positively about one group, but harder to actively antagonize another—especially when the other makes up a large chunk of the donor pool.
The lack of anti-elite rhetoric wouldn’t be so concerning if not for another important result: Candidates who employ such rhetoric perform better than other candidates in highly-working-class districts—to the tune of two to three percentage points. Crucially, this relationship persists after we control for relevant candidate and district factors that influence elections, across a range of statistical specifications. This is consistent with findings from our previous experimental research, as well those of other pollsters.
Nor will mere rhetoric be enough: As we’ve demonstrated elsewhere, politicians’ words must be backed up with an ambitious policy agenda that addresses working-class grievances in order to be taken seriously.
If Democrats hope to win back working-class voters in an environment of elite distrust, which they should, more of them will have to acknowledge and validate that distrust. This is a tall order, as there are major forces militating against them. Party messaging naturally caters to the base, so deploying anti-elite rhetoric has only become more difficult as Democrats have begun to transform into an upper-class party. Wealthy donors from elite and corporate backgrounds continue to fund Democratic campaigns. And the upper class also works overtime to make populism the object of widespread fear: In media and intellectual circles, a torrential ideological current frantically sounds the alarm against mob rule, against anti-intellectualism, against “the paranoid style” of the masses—against, in short, a bevy of bogeymen that have been called on to disparage populist movements since the 1890s.
But unlike these imagined evils, the dangers of shooing away economic populism are all too real. The GOP is embracing populism, at least in name—in the selection of Vance, in hosting Teamsters President Sean O’ Brien at the Republican National Convention, and in the party’s changing language. Ceding that ground to Republicans, in this moment of fluid coalitions, could cement Democrats’ role as being seen as the elite party—and potentially help usher in a second Trump term that promises to be disastrous, especially for working people.
Harris and other Democrats should instead recognize populism for what it is—a powerful egalitarian sentiment promising to lift up the many over the few—and give voice to it. It would be a profound mistake to miss this opportunity.
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