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regime change
Biden Is Right to Take Credit for Enabling Assad’s Fall, But Is That a Good Thing?
Rather than being open about the implications of “catastrophic success,” Biden has taken pride in how he and his predecessors have implemented policies that enabled a U.S.-designated terrorist organization to force Assad from the country.
Dec 18, 2024
Officials in the Biden administration are taking credit for creating conditions in Syria that enabled opposition forces to overthrow the Syrian government.
Now that opposition forces have ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, administration officials are insisting that longstanding U.S. policies, including actions taken by the Biden administration against Assad’s supporters, made the overthrow of the Syrian government possible. Administration officials deny that they aided Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the U.S.-designated terrorist organization that led the drive to overthrow Assad, but they insist that they facilitated the opposition’s victory, citing years of U.S. efforts to empower the opposition and weaken the Syrian government.
Just as U.S. officials have claimed, the United States played a central role in creating the conditions that led to Assad’s ouster.
U.S. policy “has led to the situation we’re in today,” State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a December 9 press briefing, the day after Assad fled the country. It “was developed during the latter stages of the Obama administration” and “has largely carried through to this day.”
White House Spokesperson John Kirby agreed, giving credit to the president. “We believe that developments in Syria very much prove the case of President Biden’s assertive foreign policy,” Kirby said in remarks to the press on December 10.
U.S. Policy
For over a decade, the United States has sought regime change in Syria. Officials in Washington have openly called for an end to the rule of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the repressive and authoritarian leader who first began ruling Syria in 2000, following decades of rule by his father, Hafez al-Assad.
U.S. efforts to oust Assad date back to 2011, when Syria descended into a civil war. As Assad responded to popular uprisings with violent crackdowns, the United States began supporting multiple armed groups, several of which were seeking the overthrow of the Syrian government.
The Obama administration designed the initial U.S. strategy to oust Assad. Hoping to avoid “catastrophic success,” or a situation in which extremists ousted Assad and seized power, the administration decided on a stalemate strategy. The United States provided opposition forces with enough support to keep pressure on Assad but not enough to overthrow him.
The administration’s goal was “a political settlement, a scenario that relies on an eventual stalemate among the warring factions rather than a clear victor,” U.S. officials explained at the time, as reported by The Washington Post.
The Obama administration came close to achieving its objectives in 2015, when opposition forces began moving into areas around Damascus. With Assad under growing pressure, it appeared that he might lose his grip on power and be forced to negotiate or surrender.
As opposition forces gained momentum, however, Assad received a lifeline from Russia, which intervened to save him. By coming to Assad’s assistance with airstrikes and military support, Russia enabled Assad to turn the tide against the rebels and remain in power.
Following Russia’s intervention, the civil war largely settled into stalemate, which left Syria divided into different areas of control. Assad consolidated his control of Damascus and the surrounding areas with support from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Many opposition forces regrouped in northwestern Syria, where they received support from Turkey. Kurdish-led forces, which were separate from the opposition, carved out an autonomous region in northeastern Syria, keeping another part of the country outside of Assad’s control.
Keeping Pressure on Assad
As the civil war cooled, U.S. officials maintained its strategy of stalemate. Although they believed that Assad had secured his position in Damascus, they remained convinced that they could still pressure him into resigning, primarily by keeping him weakened and denying him a victory.
U.S. policies to keep Assad weakened spanned the administrations of Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. These policies included the diplomatic isolation of Assad, severe economic sanctions on Syria, ongoing military strikes inside Syria, and additional support to opposition groups.
With Syria becoming a “cadaver state,” as an official in the Trump administration described it, U.S. policies also kept the country dismembered. By preventing Assad from regaining control of areas that he had lost in the war, U.S. officials hoped to pressure him into accepting a political transition.
Since the Obama administration first devised the strategy of stalemate, which helped transform Syria into a dismembered cadaver state, Assad ruled over a devastated country, one that may never recover.
U.S. officials focused much of their efforts on the Kurdish-led forces in the northeast, an area that includes strategically important wheat fields and oil reserves. Although the Kurds did not seek to overthrow Assad, wanting instead official recognition for their autonomous region inside Syria, U.S. officials knew they could undermine Assad by keeping northeastern Syria outside his control.
At the same time, U.S. officials worked to ensure that opposition forces remained in control of northwestern Syria. Even with the region controlled by HTS, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, U.S. officials abetted the group’s operations, viewing HTS as “an asset” and believing it was critical to keeping Syria dismembered.
“I just did everything I could to be able to monitor what they were doing and ensuring that those people who spoke to them knew what our policy was, which was to leave HTS alone,” former U.S. diplomat James Jeffrey acknowledged in a 2021 interview with the PBS program Frontline.
Questions about the Biden Administration’s Approach
Since the Biden administration entered office in 2021, however, it has been largely quiet about its intentions for Syria. Although the administration appeared to continue the strategy of stalemate, mainly by keeping Assad weakened and Syria dismembered, administration officials rarely expressed a great deal of interest in the country.
As administration officials grew quiet, some lawmakers grew suspicious, wondering whether the Biden administration was abandoning the project of ousting Assad. During a 2022 congressional hearing, congressional leaders criticized the administration for creating an impression that it had accepted Assad’s rule.
“I remain concerned this administration has accepted Assad’s rule as a foregone conclusion,” U.S. Senator James Risch (R-Idaho) remarked.
From 2022 to 2023, a number of U.S. allies in the Middle East began moving to restore relations with Assad. In May 2023, Arab leaders welcomed Syria back into the Arab League, ending its suspension from the organization. Officials in the Biden administration criticized the moves, but they did not express any interest in returning to the more volatile dynamics of the civil war.
In fact, recent news reports indicate that the Biden administration was working to forge a deal in which Assad cut ties to Iran in exchange for reductions in pressure on his government. This major diplomatic push, which involved the United States and its Gulf allies, preceded the recent armed uprising that ousted Assad, leading to speculation that the Biden administration had been anticipating a future in which the Syrian leader remained in power.
Revivals and Surprises
After HTS began its offensive in late November 2024, the Biden administration revived a familiar playbook. Resorting to the ideas and tactics of its predecessors, the administration presented HTS’s maneuvers in a manner that fit with a policy of stalemate.
In a December 1 interview with CNN, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan pointed to the stalemate framework by making two basic points. The first was that the Biden administration had concerns about HTS, which Sullivan placed “at the vanguard” of the uprising. “We have real concerns about the designs and objectives of that organization,” he said, acknowledging it is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
His second point was that the Biden administration did not see the actions taken by HTS as particularly worrisome, as they could potentially weaken the Syrian government. “We don’t cry over the fact that the Assad government, backed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, [is] facing certain kinds of pressure,” Sullivan said.
The Biden administration’s resurgent American empire has also had major consequences for Syria.
Even as administration officials saw advantages to be gained from the stalemate strategy, however, it remained unclear just how much pressure the Biden administration wanted HTS to put on Assad. Once HTS began making rapid gains, officials appeared to grow concerned.
“These are not good folks,” White House Spokesperson John Kirby said on December 2, referring to HTS.
Still, some observers indicated that there was a strategic logic to HTS’s moves. Former U.S. official Andrew Tabler, who worked on U.S. policy toward Syria in the Trump administration, suggested at a policy forum hosted by The Washington Institute that the uprising could test Assad’s capabilities.
“They just decided to sort of poke the front lines, so to speak, in a very dramatic way,” Tabler said.
Tabler acknowledged that HTS’s uprising revealed significant weaknesses in Assad’s capabilities, but he anticipated that it would take several years to pressure Assad into leaving office. Like many officials in Washington, he saw the offensive as a way to increase pressure on the Syrian government rather than the beginning of the end to Assad’s rule.
“This is a challenge to the regime, but it’s not going to lead to its immediate collapse,” Tabler said.
In fact, many U.S. officials did not anticipate that the offensive would lead to a sudden collapse of the Syrian government. Given that Assad had previously survived a comparable challenge in 2015, there were strong beliefs both inside and outside of Washington that Assad and his supporters would continue to repel opposition forces.
“I think the entire international community was surprised to see that the opposition forces moved as quickly as they did,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin later noted. “Everybody expected to see a much more stiff resistance from Assad’s forces.”
It was only once opposition forces began to take control of Aleppo in early December, about a week before Assad fled the country, that the Biden administration began planning for the possibility of Assad’s downfall, according to U.S. officials.
When “we saw the fall of Aleppo, we started to prepare for all possible contingencies,” a senior official in the Biden administration explained.
Indeed, the speed of the opposition’s movement caught many of the highest-level officials in the Biden administration by surprise, as they had been working on the assumption that Assad would remain in power for the immediate future.
“We didn’t directly see the fall of Assad,” State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller acknowledged.
Shifting Balance of Power
Regardless of the ebb and flow of the Biden administration’s Syria policy, years of U.S. actions have clearly taken a toll on Syria. Just as U.S. officials have claimed, the United States played a central role in creating the conditions that led to Assad’s ouster.
Since the Obama administration first devised the strategy of stalemate, which helped transform Syria into a dismembered cadaver state, Assad ruled over a devastated country, one that may never recover.
The Biden administration’s resurgent American empire has also had major consequences for Syria. By spending the past two years supporting Ukraine against Russia and the past year backing Israel’s military offensives across the Middle East, the Biden administration has implemented policies that have imposed major costs on Assad’s supporters, especially Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Without external support, the longtime Syrian leader could no longer withstand violent challenges to his rule.
Shortly after the fall of Assad, President Biden recognized the implications of his administration’s actions, claiming in a major address that U.S. policies set the stage for Assad’s downfall. Even while acknowledging that “some of the rebel groups that took down Assad have their own grim record of terrorism and human right abuses,” he proudly insisted that his administration’s actions had made regime change possible.
Indeed, President Biden has been quick to take credit for the overthrow of another government in the Middle East. Rather than being open about the implications of “catastrophic success,” Biden has taken pride in how he and his predecessors have implemented policies that enabled a U.S.-designated terrorist organization to force Assad from the country.
“Our approach has shifted the balance of power in the Middle East,” Biden said. Through a “combination of support for our partners, sanctions, and diplomacy and targeted military force when necessary, we now see new opportunities opening up for the people of Syria and for the entire region.”
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The West Celebrates Assad’s Fall, But What Comes Next May Be Even Worse
How can the fall of the admittedly brutal Assad regime create a “historic opportunity” for the Syrian people when the country is now under the control of jihadists?
Dec 11, 2024
The toppling of Bashar al-Assad in Syria was cheered by U.S. President Joe Biden and other major Western leaders, like French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, as it ended the reign of a brutal regime more than 13 years after Assad’s crackdown on anti-government protests ignited Syria’s civil war.
Indeed, Biden described Assad’s fall as a “historic opportunity” for the Syrian people, echoing Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group (HTS) that took over Syria, who said, “This victory, my brothers, is historic for the region.”
But wait. Isn’t HTS on the list of banned terrorist groups and Jolani a jihadist militant whose journey began in Iraq with links to al Qaeda and later to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)? So why is the West cheering for al Qaeda and its allies?
When all is said and done, forcing regime change rarely succeeds.
The European Union Agency for Asylum describes HTS as a coalition of Islamist Sunni armed groups that “frequently commit serious human rights abuses, including harassment, assassinations, kidnapping, and torture, as well as unlawful detention of civilians.” It goes on to say that “civilians have also been extorted and kidnapped for ransom” and that “the group has conducted formal military campaigns, assassinations, hostage takings, and ‘lone wolf’ operations, including suicide bombings,” while “members of religious minorities have been forced to convert to Islam and adopt Sunni customs.”
So, what is going on here? How can the fall of the admittedly brutal Assad regime create a “historic opportunity” for the Syrian people when the country is now under the control of jihadists? But we’ve been witness to this comedy drama before. From 1979 to 1989, the United States (along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) armed and financed the Afghan Islamist fighters known as the mujahideen who were fighting the Soviet Union. The plan from the beginning was to keep the Islamist insurgency going for as long as possible, thus sucking the Soviets into a Vietnam-style quagmire.
The Islamist fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets was “the good jihad,” according to Washington. The mujahideen were fighting for peace against an enemy of the Western world and deserved U.S. support. Of course, we know how that turned out.
The Bush administration embarked on a campaign against terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, with the first phase of the campaign focusing on “capturing or killing bin Laden, destroying his al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and deposing the Taliban-regime.”
Undoubtedly, bombing into oblivion the Islamists in Syria if the new government, headed by Mohammed al-Bashir who has been appointed as interim prime minister, fails to lead a new path is a contingency plan that Washington has probably already considered. The job, in fact, could be given to Israel, for whom bombing is second nature. Since the fall of Assad, Israel has already carried out hundreds of airstrikes across Syria, targeting airports, naval bases, and military infrastructure. And the U.S. Central Command announced that it has struck more than 75 targets, including ISIS leaders, operatives, and camps.
Hypocrisy and duplicity, followed in the end by astonishing moral and political somersaults, are trademarks of the way Washington and its Western allies approach world affairs and conduct diplomacy. And these elements have been in full display since the start of Syria’s civil war. The Obama administration provided support to the anti-Assad forces, primarily to the Free Syrian Army forces and its affiliates, but the CIA began to support other groups as early as 2013 even though they had jihadi orientations. CIA’s covert operation against the Syrian regime, known as Timber Sycamore, was a joint effort with Saudi Arabia that had long ties with radical Islamist groups. But regime change is what Washington was after in Syria, so everything else was of secondary concern.
The fall of the Assad regime has staggering implications for security in the region, but the speed with which it collapsed suggests that, in the end, it may have been mainly internal rather than external pressures that made the difference. Syria was under imperialist attack for the past 13 years. The U.S. (along with Turkey) backed and funded mercenaries and terrorist forces against Assad’s regime, imposed economic isolation of the country through sanctions, and denied plans that would have contributed to reconstruction even though aid was desperately needed for civilians. In April 2017, the U.S. even ordered direct military action against Syria in retaliation for the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. The Trump administration claimed to have been moved by the deaths of some 80 civilians; yet then-President Donald Trump refused to lift his ban on accepting Syrian refugees into the U.S.
But the Assad regime had created a hellish place, with 90% of Syrians living in poverty and widespread malnutrition. The country was in a vicious downward spiral. The economy had plummeted by 85% due to nearly 14 years of civil war. The inflation rate had risen to over 120% in 2024 while electricity production had dropped by 80%, with power outrages having become a common phenomenon. And the only thing that the Assad’s regime had to offer was more repression.
Still, the collapse of the regime, now celebrated throughout the Western world, raises more questions than answers. There are too many actors, both inside and outside Syria, with diverse interests and conflicting goals and aims. Assad’s regime used secularism as a tool to repress opponents, but there should be no expectations for the emergence of stable secular nationalism in Syria anytime soon. The fear that Syria will face the same fate as Afghanistan is also unfounded. The country has too many hostile factions for a dominant group like the Taliban to take complete control of the country. If anything, it is probably destined to become a failed state like Libya following the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi in 2011 with the help of NATO, an event that was also widely celebrated by the Western leaders of the time.
Indeed, when all is said and done, forcing regime change rarely succeeds. In fact, U.S. foreign policy has been an unmitigated disaster in the post-Cold War period, creating more problems that it tried to solve. Think of the Balkans, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East.
Syria will be no different. It was a hellish place under Assad but will more likely than not end up next as another “black hole” in the lost list of U.S. "achievements" in forcing regime change.
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On the Need for Transparency in Venezuela
Following a disputed election, the government of President Nicolás Maduro has yet to publicly release the full tally sheets of the results. Meanwhile, U.S. officials are keeping quiet about their links to the opposition.
Aug 06, 2024
Since the disputed July 28 presidential election in Venezuela, U.S. officials have been calling for transparency from the Venezuelan government while keeping quiet about their efforts at regime change.
Claiming that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has stolen the election, U.S. officials have been working to bring to power the Venezuelan opposition. With nothing to say about their decadeslong relationship with opposition leader María Corina Machado, who has previously benefited from U.S. funding, U.S. officials have been portraying the opposition as a popular movement that won the election, all without external support or interference.
“The Venezuelan people deserve an election that genuinely reflects their will, free from any manipulation,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on the day of the election.
If U.S. officials are serious about wanting to see an election free from any manipulation, then they must be transparent about the U.S. role in the country. While it remains important for the Venezuelan government to release detailed voting results, just as several leftist leaders in Latin America have requested, it also remains critical for the United States to release detailed records about its relationship with the opposition, something it has spent years trying to keep hidden.
U.S. Manipulation
For decades, the United States has been the primary source of manipulation in Venezuela. With the goal of achieving regime change, the United States has been supporting an opposition movement that has been trying to mobilize the Venezuelan people against the Venezuelan government.
During the early 2000s, U.S. officials worked closely with Machado, the current opposition leader, who has long faced allegations of trying to overthrow the Venezuelan government. With funding from the U.S. government and support from U.S. diplomats, she and her organization Súmate led an effort in 2004 to oust then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in a recall referendum. When it failed, Machado repeatedly cast doubt on the results, even though data collected by her organization indicated that Chávez had won, just as election monitors found.
At the time, former President Jimmy Carter charged members of Súmate with deliberately distributing misleading data for the purpose of manipulating the election. “There’s no doubt some of their leaders deliberately distributed this erroneous exit poll data,” Carter said, as reported by The New York Times.
Since then, U.S. leaders have overseen many additional efforts at regime change, targeting both Chávez and Maduro, all of which have failed. In 2019, the Trump administration made one of the most audacious moves, rallying behind opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who led a failed uprising and later fled the country.
At the same time that they are demanding that the Venezuelan government be transparent about the results, [U.S. officials] are keeping quiet about their own efforts to empower the opposition and achieve regime change.
“Our conundrum, which is to keep the opposition united, has proven devilishly difficult,” then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lamented, as reported by The Washington Post.
In the July 28 election, the Venezuelan people voted in the context of widespread social and economic collapse, which has been facilitated by the United States. During the Trump administration, U.S. officials imposed severe sanctions on Venezuela, trying to make life so miserable for the Venezuelan people that they would turn against the Venezuelan government.
As former officials in the Trump administration recently acknowledged, they expected their approach to cause the Venezuelan economy to collapse and many people to flee the country. Not only did their actions push Venezuela into the one of worst economic collapses in modern history, but they made life so difficult that more than 7 million Venezuelans fled the country in one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.
Many Venezuelan migrants have sought entry to the United States, driving the large increase in border crossings, all of which had been anticipated.
The Venezuelan people who have remained in their homeland are still suffering from the effects of U.S. sanctions. Even with the recent election, they have faced few good options, having been forced to deal with a hostile United States.
One of their options has been to support Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the current target of the United States. A vote for Maduro could lead the United States to preserve its sanctions, all but guaranteeing more years of suffering.
Another one of their options has been to side with the U.S.-backed opposition. A vote for the opposition could lead to relief from U.S. sanctions, but it risks bringing to power a right-wing regime that will prioritize U.S. interests and perhaps even transfer the country’s oil wealth to U.S. corporations. Machado, for example, has insisted that she will privatize PDVSA, the state oil company.
Although the Venezuelan government barred Machado from running for office, she remains the main opposition leader, being the driving force behind little-known opposition candidate Edmundo González, who has been serving as her proxy.
U.S. officials have said that public opinion polls display widespread support for González, but critics have questioned their reliability. Analysts at the Center for Economic Policy and Research have reported that support for González has been overestimated, largely due to polling bias.
U.S. Secrecy
Through it all, U.S. officials have been highly secretive about their actions, even while calling for transparency. They have not disclosed which opposition groups they are funding, a longstanding practice.
Neither have they been open about their links to Machado, perhaps due to a critical change in their approach that they began to consider after the 2004 referendum. Once the Venezuelan government began publicizing Machado’s connections to the United States, even charging her and her colleagues with treason, U.S. officials began to consider how they could empower her without appearing as if they were her puppet-master.
During a private meeting on January 10, 2005, then-U.S. Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) floated one possibility, advising Machado and her colleagues “to seek international financing from non-U.S. sources” so that the Venezuelan government “cannot credibly label Súmate as a USG-backed organization.”
Machado rejected the advice, however, insisting that Súmate should be able to openly receive funding from the United States, including from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). “Foreign financing for NGOs is legal, despite the GOV’s contention to the contrary,” she claimed. “Súmate will continue to apply for NED and other grants.”
Initially, the U.S. government supported her approach. In 2005, then-President George W. Bush welcomed Machado to the White House, where he openly supported her. Not long after the meeting, Machado announced that the United States would provide Súmate with additional funding.
Concerned about how the Venezuelan government might respond, U.S. diplomats in Venezuela, who were closely coordinating with Súmate, called for some adjustments. Their main advice was to continue supporting Súmate while making it appear as if there was some distance between Súmate and the United States.
“A continuing, too evident, public identification with the U.S. could now be counterproductive,” the diplomats warned. “At the same time, however, we need to ensure that Súmate has the resources it needs to exploit this new vantage point it enjoys.”
Not only have U.S. officials remained silent about these past moves, but they have been employing many of the same tactics. Taking the approach favored by U.S. diplomats, officials in Washington have been trying to appear distant from the opposition while remaining supportive.
During the most recent election, the Biden administration prepared for multiple scenarios, including ways of supporting the opposition in the case that Maduro was declared the winner. With its public diplomacy, it has framed the vote as a struggle by an admirable and heroic opposition against a corrupt and fraudulent government, just as past administrations have done.
In perhaps its most striking move, Biden administration declared that the opposition won the election, even without having access to the data that administration officials repeatedly said is necessary for confirming the results. After spending days demanding that the Venezuelan government release detailed polling data, the administration went ahead and announced the opposition’s victory anyway.
“Venezuelan opposition and civil society provided decisive evidence showing that Edmundo González received a majority of the votes in this election,” State Department Spokesperson Vedant Patel claimed.
Indeed, U.S. officials are once again throwing their support behind the opposition. At the same time that they are demanding that the Venezuelan government be transparent about the results, they are keeping quiet about their own efforts to empower the opposition and achieve regime change.
Until the United States lifts its sanctions and ends its meddling, the people of Venezuela will never participate in elections that are free from manipulation, just as Secretary of State Antony Blinken insisted they deserve.
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